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 | | From: | Lester Zick | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Wed, 05 Jan 2005 19:46:42 GMT |
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 | On 5 Jan 2005 08:27:52 -0800, "Mike" in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>Lester Zick wrote:
>>
>> No, I meant effects in the sense that the empirical result of mental
>> effects is human behavior. Look at the problem this way. We have
>> circumstantial contingencies and we have human behavior. I maintain
>> that mentation, the mind, or mental effects, M, mediate contingencies
>> and behavior B=MC the way inertial mass mediates acceleration and
>> force, f=ma. And this is true regardless of what M may turn out to
>be.
>
>Crank alert
You or me?
>> No one understands mass in any irreducible, fundamental sense anymore
>> than we understand the mind. We keep f=ma around on purely
>utilitarian
>> grounds because its use enables us to explain acceleration in terms
>of
>> force consistently if not absolutely for palpable bodies.
>>
>
>The concept of mass leads to confirmed experimental prediction and it
>is therefore well-founded.
Yes, I believe that's the point I just made. Being well founded is a
criterion of utility, not truth. Are there other points of mine you'd
like to echo?
>Crank alert
You or me?
>> But we don't keep the concept of mind around on utilitarian grounds
>> the way we do mass. We keep it around on reductionist grounds because
>> it regresses finitely even if we don't understand all of the
>mechanics
>> involved. Thus M is definable in the sense of finite reduction
>whereas
>> m is not.
>>
>
>Crank alert
You or me?
>> It's an empirical observation nonetheless.
>
>Crank alert
You or me?
>>
>> >
>> Which I observe is to be explained in terms of contingencies through
>> the mediation of M. As I understand behaviorism - what little I
>> understand of behaviorism, I should add - that philosophy maintains
>> that B=C+P (private behavior) or perhaps B=PC. The problem with this
>> explanation is that behaviorism admits it doesn't understand what P
>> is. So there is no reduction and hence no explanation of B in terms
>of
>> C.
>>
>
>Crank alert
You or me?
>> Taken on faith the way we take mass on faith. In the case of mass
>> there is a demonstrable consistency of reduction between f and a
>> which is lacking in M. But in the case of M there is a demonstrably
>> finite reduction in mediation lacking in m.
>
>Crank alert at maximum
>
>> Well, there is more than experience I can check on. I can also check
>> on whether there is a finite reduction in the mediation provided by
>M.
>> If so we have a definable M regardless of whether we understand M on
>> utilitarian grounds the way we understand m.
>>
>
>Crank alert above all known levels
>
>
>> At first pass I
>> suggest that the term mechanical just means relations between
>> empirical observations drawn through tautologies.
>>
>
>Mechanical in the philosophy of science is a term used to ground
>causality.
Thanks so much for the insight.
> The other alternative is conterfactuals. It is usually not
>relations between empirical observations but the use of term mechanical
>suggests a causal connection between some empirical quantity and some
>unobservable quantity. This is used mainly in Realist's grounds whereas
>anti-realists argue that the mechanical hypothesis is not well-founded
>and therefore adhere to an acausal world.
Does bleu cheese dressing come with this word salad?
>Crank alert has hit level unkown in this galaxy,
Actually in the universe.
Regards - Lester
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