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 | | From: | Lester Zick | | Subject: | Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 03 Jan 2005 15:37:13 GMT |
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Epistemology 102
--------
(Scientific Truth)
Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
They are also required to explain what they would deny because
empirical observations in general could mean anything.
Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
of utility for science other than truth. We proposed one measure of
utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
of complexity is for any theory.
Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
science addresses things in different ways.
For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
--------
We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
--------
Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.The distinction is
a positivistic reliance on ambiguous criteria of utility for empirical
sciences as opposed to the tautological regression of empirical
observations to axioms for the so-called tautological sciences such as
math, logic, etc. However, it must be noted that in the tautological
sciences there is no further regression or tautological reduction of
empirical observations beyond axioms and axioms themselves must be
justified by appeals to intuitive correctness in a manner analogous to
justification for all empirical observations in empirical science.
Now, however, let's see if there isn't some way to unite tautological
and empirical sciences on a common foundation through regression to
some criterion of truth in general. We begin by noting a common basis
for tautological regression or reduction in both kinds of science, the
ordinary or particular tautology t:[subject][not subject] to which all
empirical observations must be subject or they cannot be true.
Further we note that alternatives to t:[subject][not subject] must
always be false, that t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject]
completes or perfects all possibilities in particular tautologies for
true and false. Now we need only ask what is it in tautologies which
can be proven to reduce to truth and falsity regardless of subject?
--------
We begin with the empirical observation [not] and find tautological
regression leads directly to [not not]. We find that T:[not][not not]
is not further reducible or regressible because it already contains
its own self contradiction and we infer from this that [not] is always
true and [not not] always false such that T:[not][not not] applies to
all tautologies based on empirical observations regardless of subject.
Therefore [not] is true of all empirical observations and forms the
mechanical basis for all empirical observations of whatever nature
which can be true and [not not] the mechanical basis for all empirical
observations which are false.
But what does the empirical observation [not] mean exactly?
--------
There are a couple of ways to address this question. I characterize
[not] as differences and [not not] as different from differences. We
could note that [not] might also be described as negation or some
equivalent, but the difficulty is that none of these characterizations
adds much more to the meaning of [not] than mere amplification.
The difficulty is that we cannot further define [not] because [not] is
the mechanical basis of definition. And if we apply [not] to the
definition of [not] the result is self contradiction. We can apply
[not] between other results of [not] but we cannot gain further
insight to the nature of [not] itself through tautological reduction.
--------
The other part of the puzzle are the implications of [not] and what it
means in practice. Now the interesting thing here is that [not] has
every implication because it forms the basis in mechanical terms of
everything that can be true. But the other interesting aspect is that
I don't have to know what the implications of [not] are or have to be
in order to know that [not] is necessarily true of everything. That is
necessarily true because [not not] is necessarily self contradictory.
As a practical matter it is possible to observe that [not] can apply
to the results of other [not]'s without self contradiction. In other
words, we cannot have different from differences but we can have
differences between differences, differences between differences
between differences, etc. as far as mechanical limitations allow
because there is no necessary self contradiction involved.
--------
(Conclusion)
In summary we have differences in general as the mechanical basis for
everything that can be true and we have the potential for differences
between differences etc. as the mechanical basis for sentience and all
other forms of empirical observations which can be true. But we have
very little comprehension of what such things mean in practice.
By way of a very loose analogy, let's suppose we might visualize [not]
or differences compounded in terms of one another as a three
dimensional tautological grid. And as long as we remain on it we can
transit the grid with every confidence that what we conclude is true
and not false. However, the moment we slip off the grid of differences
and differences between differences etc. we fall into the necessity of
self contradiction. So the only problem is transiting the grid and not
whether what we do is true or false as long as we remain on the grid.
Regards - Lester
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| | From: | Wolf Kirchmeir | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 03 Jan 2005 12:15:31 -0500 |
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| Lester Zick wrote:
[...]
> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
[...]
You can't "deny an empirical observation." An empirical observation was
either made under the conditions epcified, or it wasn't. If you follow
the recipe, and can't replicate the observation, there are a multitude
of possible reasons why, ranging from badly reported/described
observations by the original investigator, to badly replicated
experimental conditions, to oversight of some crucial condition(s) by
the original investigator and/or the replicator. In any case, if
replication fails, something needs to be done over.
It's the interpretation of the observations that leaves room for debate
and doubt. If people don't accept the same primary assumptions, they are
talking past each other. That's why definiton of terms, and careful
limitation of reference, is crucial to scientific advance. The history
of science shows that all advances came about because people realised
their assumptions were vague, inconsistent, ambiguous, or wrong. That
enabled both reinterpretation of past empirical observations, and
recognition of factors that had been ignored.
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| | From: | Lester Zick | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 03 Jan 2005 19:38:23 GMT |
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| On Mon, 03 Jan 2005 12:15:31 -0500, Wolf Kirchmeir
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
>[...]
>> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
>> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
>> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
>> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
>> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
>> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>[...]
>
>You can't "deny an empirical observation."
Sure you can. I empirically observe that human behavior is the result
of mental effects. Behaviorism denies that but can't explain what it
is denying. Either that or you're denying that the observation is
empirical, in which case you're in the same position of explaining
what an empirical observation is. In which case you place yourself in
the position of having to explain how geometric, mathematical, and
logical empirical observations are not empirical as well in which case
you place yourself in the position of having to explain the mechanical
origin of the duality of observation. And I suggest it is easier to
explain the unity of all observations as empirical subject to
tautological regression in all cases because we can show finite
regression and reduction in tautological analysis whereas we can't
show the absence of unlimited regression for empircal observation.
> An empirical observation was
>either made under the conditions epcified, or it wasn't. If you follow
>the recipe, and can't replicate the observation, there are a multitude
>of possible reasons why, ranging from badly reported/described
>observations by the original investigator, to badly replicated
>experimental conditions, to oversight of some crucial condition(s) by
>the original investigator and/or the replicator. In any case, if
>replication fails, something needs to be done over.
What you're ignoring, Wolf, is that you have no unambiguous definition
for the term empirical. Some say it's this; some say it's that. What I
say is that the term empirical means unlimited regression and that the
term logical means finite or limited regression through tautological
analysis through T:[not][not not].
An unlimited regression of empirical observations is just historically
serial in nature, regressing events through historical causation in
terms of other events. But when those same empirical observations are
regressed or reduced logically, we find the regression is limited due
to the finite tautological regression implied in T:[not][not not].
>It's the interpretation of the observations that leaves room for debate
>and doubt. If people don't accept the same primary assumptions, they are
>talking past each other. That's why definiton of terms, and careful
>limitation of reference, is crucial to scientific advance. The history
>of science shows that all advances came about because people realised
>their assumptions were vague, inconsistent, ambiguous, or wrong. That
>enabled both reinterpretation of past empirical observations, and
>recognition of factors that had been ignored.
But the question I'm addressing is how regression, reduction, and
interpretation and reinterpretation take place in mechanical terms.
Regards - Lester
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| | From: | Wolf Kirchmeir | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 03 Jan 2005 20:29:51 -0500 |
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| Lester Zick wrote:
> On Mon, 03 Jan 2005 12:15:31 -0500, Wolf Kirchmeir
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>
>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>[...]
>>
>>>This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
>>>defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
>>>observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
>>>opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
>>>They are also required to explain what they would deny because
>>>empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>>
>>[...]
>>
>>You can't "deny an empirical observation."
>
>
> Sure you can. I empirically observe that human behavior is the result
> of mental effects.
Well, it's nice to know something can be the result of an effect. :-)
I'll assume you merely misspoke, and meant something like "mental events."
That's your interpretation of the empirical observations. All you can
observe of other people is their behaviour. You can observe some of your
own behaviour, including some of what you call "mental effects". Since
we don't know what those are, any claim you make about their causal
relationship to your behaviour has to be taken on faith. There is no way
of checking - not even you can check it, since all you have is your
experience, which is incomplete - ie, there are certainly mental events
of which you are unaware. (BTW, those are the ones which are somewhat
easier to discover as having occurred than the ones you claim have
occurred. Why should this be so?)
Several studies attempting to find the temporal relationship between
neural potentiation and human reports of having decided to do something,
or of human actions that are supposedly evidence of having decided, show
that potentiation occurs before the deciding or the action that is
purportedly evidence of deciding. If these studies are valid, ie, if
they are replicated in other contexts and with variations, then it would
seem that the mental events of which we are aware occur after the ones
that cause our behaviour.
Your definition of "empirical" is unlike any Ive ever encountered
before, and tautological, too, so of course it's never wrong. Which has
deluded you into believing you have discoverd a Great Truth.
BTW, the more you use "mechanical", the less I can make sense of what
you mean by it.
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| | From: | Lester Zick | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Tue, 04 Jan 2005 19:58:57 GMT |
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| On Mon, 03 Jan 2005 20:29:51 -0500, Wolf Kirchmeir
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Mon, 03 Jan 2005 12:15:31 -0500, Wolf Kirchmeir
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>[...]
>>>
>>>>This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
>>>>defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
>>>>observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
>>>>opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
>>>>They are also required to explain what they would deny because
>>>>empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>>>
>>>[...]
>>>
>>>You can't "deny an empirical observation."
>>
>>
>> Sure you can. I empirically observe that human behavior is the result
>> of mental effects.
>
>Well, it's nice to know something can be the result of an effect. :-)
>I'll assume you merely misspoke, and meant something like "mental events."
No, I meant effects in the sense that the empirical result of mental
effects is human behavior. Look at the problem this way. We have
circumstantial contingencies and we have human behavior. I maintain
that mentation, the mind, or mental effects, M, mediate contingencies
and behavior B=MC the way inertial mass mediates acceleration and
force, f=ma. And this is true regardless of what M may turn out to be.
No one understands mass in any irreducible, fundamental sense anymore
than we understand the mind. We keep f=ma around on purely utilitarian
grounds because its use enables us to explain acceleration in terms of
force consistently if not absolutely for palpable bodies.
But we don't keep the concept of mind around on utilitarian grounds
the way we do mass. We keep it around on reductionist grounds because
it regresses finitely even if we don't understand all of the mechanics
involved. Thus M is definable in the sense of finite reduction whereas
m is not.
>That's your interpretation of the empirical observations.
It's an empirical observation nonetheless.
> All you can
>observe of other people is their behaviour.
Which I observe is to be explained in terms of contingencies through
the mediation of M. As I understand behaviorism - what little I
understand of behaviorism, I should add - that philosophy maintains
that B=C+P (private behavior) or perhaps B=PC. The problem with this
explanation is that behaviorism admits it doesn't understand what P
is. So there is no reduction and hence no explanation of B in terms of
C.
> You can observe some of your
>own behaviour, including some of what you call "mental effects". Since
>we don't know what those are, any claim you make about their causal
>relationship to your behaviour has to be taken on faith.
Taken on faith the way we take mass on faith. In the case of mass
there is a demonstrable consistency of reduction between f and a
which is lacking in M. But in the case of M there is a demonstrably
finite reduction in mediation lacking in m.
> There is no way
>of checking - not even you can check it, since all you have is your
>experience, which is incomplete - ie, there are certainly mental events
>of which you are unaware. (BTW, those are the ones which are somewhat
>easier to discover as having occurred than the ones you claim have
>occurred. Why should this be so?)
Well, there is more than experience I can check on. I can also check
on whether there is a finite reduction in the mediation provided by M.
If so we have a definable M regardless of whether we understand M on
utilitarian grounds the way we understand m.
>Several studies attempting to find the temporal relationship between
>neural potentiation and human reports of having decided to do something,
>or of human actions that are supposedly evidence of having decided, show
>that potentiation occurs before the deciding or the action that is
>purportedly evidence of deciding. If these studies are valid, ie, if
>they are replicated in other contexts and with variations, then it would
>seem that the mental events of which we are aware occur after the ones
>that cause our behaviour.
>
>Your definition of "empirical" is unlike any Ive ever encountered
>before, and tautological, too, so of course it's never wrong. Which has
>deluded you into believing you have discoverd a Great Truth.
Deluded me? I hardly think so unless you can show some other basis for
the definition of empirical. At least you have the courtesy to note
that it's never wrong. Which means it must be right if alternatives
are self contradictory. The problem with most definitions is that they
can be wrong and thus must be justified on problematic utilitarian
grounds instead. The same old problem with positivism generally. It
helps considerably if we start out with a definition that can't be
wrong. Then at least we have something to shoot with even if we don't
yet exactly understand what we're shooting for.
>BTW, the more you use "mechanical", the less I can make sense of what
>you mean by it.
And the more I use it the less I make of it as well. At first pass I
suggest that the term mechanical just means relations between
empirical observations drawn through tautologies.
Regards - Lester
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| | From: | JPL Verhey | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Wed, 5 Jan 2005 12:01:50 +0100 |
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"Wolf Kirchmeir" wrote in message
news:UimCd.10978$P%3.897530@news20.bellglobal.com...
> attempting to find the temporal relationship between neural
> potentiation and human reports of having decided to do something, or
> of human actions that are supposedly evidence of having decided, show
> that potentiation occurs before the deciding or the action that is
> purportedly evidence of deciding. If these studies are valid, ie, if
> they are replicated in other contexts and with variations, then it
> would seem that the mental events of which we are aware occur after
> the ones that cause our behaviour.
It is undoubtedly true that there are many behaviors of which be become
aware after they happened. They are usually called reflexes. Another
matter is whether the bulk of those behaviors can happen without the
'after effect' of the mental events aqa awareness. Since most of those
behaviors are performed by a healthy and awake persons that are aware of
what they are doing (did, in this case), it begs the question why mental
behaviors such as awareness occur at all.. but since they do, it does
suggest that they are causally necessary for behavior such as pressing
buttons in an experiment.
Also, as I understand those experiments (Libet), what is compared are
the moment of potentiation and the *report* of the subject when s/he
thinks she decided to press the button. Obviously there can be a
difference between the factual conscious decision to press and the
report (guess) "I press(ed) the button at (t)".
And.. when I decide today that tomorrow at 09.00 I will sing the
national anthem twice under the shower, the behavior of singing the
anthem clearly happens after the mental decision to do so.
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| | From: | Allan C Cybulskie | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Tue, 4 Jan 2005 19:26:14 -0500 |
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"Wolf Kirchmeir" wrote in message
news:UimCd.10978$P%3.897530@news20.bellglobal.com...
> Lester Zick wrote:
> > Sure you can. I empirically observe that human behavior is the result
> > of mental effects.
>
> Well, it's nice to know something can be the result of an effect. :-)
Well, if everything has a cause, then every result is the result of an
effect, since the cause is just another effect to a previous cause.
> Several studies attempting to find the temporal relationship between
> neural potentiation and human reports of having decided to do something,
> or of human actions that are supposedly evidence of having decided, show
> that potentiation occurs before the deciding or the action that is
> purportedly evidence of deciding. If these studies are valid, ie, if
> they are replicated in other contexts and with variations, then it would
> seem that the mental events of which we are aware occur after the ones
> that cause our behaviour.
This would only cause any issues if we insist on insisting that being
consciously aware of a decision must be what causes the behaviour. In
hindsight, this is in no way what we are interested in. What we care about
is that "deciding" be the cause of our behaviour. It in no way casts any
doubt on any mentalistic notion to argue that our being consciously aware of
a decision and the behaviour are both merely the end results of the process
of "deciding" as it is commonly perceived.
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| | From: | patty | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 03 Jan 2005 17:35:42 GMT |
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| Lester Zick wrote:
> Epistemology 102
> --------
>
> (Scientific Truth)
>
> Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
> things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
> practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
> its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
>
> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>
> Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
> of utility for science other than truth. We proposed one measure of
> utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
> non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
> circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
> However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
>
> For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
> not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
> complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
> of complexity is for any theory.
>
> Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
> an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
> utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
> utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
>
> The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
> simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
> No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
> science addresses things in different ways.
>
> For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
> f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
> and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
> foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
> sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
> approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
> we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
>
> --------
>
> We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
> the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
> truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
> by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
> pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
> The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
> merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
>
> However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
> empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
> cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
> are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
> form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
> other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
> could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
> which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
>
.... or no complete theory or empirical observations is always true ...
which assumption most of us gladly accept.
> Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
> merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
> itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
> this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
> empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
> geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
>
> --------
>
> Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
> in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
> in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.The distinction is
> a positivistic reliance on ambiguous criteria of utility for empirical
> sciences as opposed to the tautological regression of empirical
> observations to axioms for the so-called tautological sciences such as
> math, logic, etc. However, it must be noted that in the tautological
> sciences there is no further regression or tautological reduction of
> empirical observations beyond axioms and axioms themselves must be
> justified by appeals to intuitive correctness in a manner analogous to
> justification for all empirical observations in empirical science.
>
> Now, however, let's see if there isn't some way to unite tautological
> and empirical sciences on a common foundation through regression to
> some criterion of truth in general. We begin by noting a common basis
> for tautological regression or reduction in both kinds of science, the
> ordinary or particular tautology t:[subject][not subject] to which all
> empirical observations must be subject or they cannot be true.
>
> Further we note that alternatives to t:[subject][not subject] must
> always be false, that t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject]
> completes or perfects all possibilities in particular tautologies for
> true and false. Now we need only ask what is it in tautologies which
> can be proven to reduce to truth and falsity regardless of subject?
>
> --------
>
> We begin with the empirical observation [not] and find tautological
> regression leads directly to [not not]. We find that T:[not][not not]
> is not further reducible or regressible because it already contains
> its own self contradiction and we infer from this that [not] is always
> true and [not not] always false such that T:[not][not not] applies to
> all tautologies based on empirical observations regardless of subject.
>
> Therefore [not] is true of all empirical observations and forms the
> mechanical basis for all empirical observations of whatever nature
> which can be true and [not not] the mechanical basis for all empirical
> observations which are false.
>
> But what does the empirical observation [not] mean exactly?
>
> --------
>
> There are a couple of ways to address this question. I characterize
> [not] as differences and [not not] as different from differences. We
> could note that [not] might also be described as negation or some
> equivalent, but the difficulty is that none of these characterizations
> adds much more to the meaning of [not] than mere amplification.
>
> The difficulty is that we cannot further define [not] because [not] is
> the mechanical basis of definition. And if we apply [not] to the
> definition of [not] the result is self contradiction. We can apply
> [not] between other results of [not] but we cannot gain further
> insight to the nature of [not] itself through tautological reduction.
>
> --------
>
> The other part of the puzzle are the implications of [not] and what it
> means in practice. Now the interesting thing here is that [not] has
> every implication because it forms the basis in mechanical terms of
> everything that can be true. But the other interesting aspect is that
> I don't have to know what the implications of [not] are or have to be
> in order to know that [not] is necessarily true of everything. That is
> necessarily true because [not not] is necessarily self contradictory.
>
> As a practical matter it is possible to observe that [not] can apply
> to the results of other [not]'s without self contradiction. In other
> words, we cannot have different from differences but we can have
> differences between differences, differences between differences
> between differences, etc. as far as mechanical limitations allow
> because there is no necessary self contradiction involved.
>
> --------
>
> (Conclusion)
>
> In summary we have differences in general as the mechanical basis for
> everything that can be true and we have the potential for differences
> between differences etc. as the mechanical basis for sentience and all
> other forms of empirical observations which can be true. But we have
> very little comprehension of what such things mean in practice.
>
> By way of a very loose analogy, let's suppose we might visualize [not]
> or differences compounded in terms of one another as a three
> dimensional tautological grid. And as long as we remain on it we can
> transit the grid with every confidence that what we conclude is true
> and not false. However, the moment we slip off the grid of differences
> and differences between differences etc. we fall into the necessity of
> self contradiction. So the only problem is transiting the grid and not
> whether what we do is true or false as long as we remain on the grid.
>
> Regards - Lester
Yeah, that's usually called "a complete theory": "An abstract logical
theory in which all true statements have formal proofs within the
theory."
When we fall off such a grid, we do indeed fall into the necessity of
self contradiction. The problem is that we don't know of any of those
grids which always match empirical observation.
patty
|
|
| | From: | Lester Zick | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 03 Jan 2005 19:12:22 GMT |
|
|
| On Mon, 03 Jan 2005 17:35:42 GMT, patty
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
>> Epistemology 102
>> --------
>>
>> (Scientific Truth)
>>
>> Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
>> things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
>> practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
>> its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
>>
>> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
>> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
>> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
>> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
>> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
>> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>>
>> Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
>> of utility for science other than truth. We proposed one measure of
>> utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
>> non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
>> circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
>> However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
>>
>> For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
>> not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
>> complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
>> of complexity is for any theory.
>>
>> Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
>> an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
>> utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
>> utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
>>
>> The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
>> simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
>> No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
>> science addresses things in different ways.
>>
>> For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
>> f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
>> and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
>> foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
>> sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
>> approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
>> we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
>>
>> --------
>>
>> We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
>> the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
>> truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
>> by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
>> pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
>> The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
>> merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
>>
>> However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
>> empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
>> cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
>> are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
>> form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
>> other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
>> could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
>> which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
>>
>
>... or no complete theory or empirical observations is always true ...
>which assumption most of us gladly accept.
Complacency is in fact one aspect of modern empiricism.
>> Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
>> merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
>> itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
>> this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
>> empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
>> geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
>>
>> --------
>>
>> Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
>> in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
>> in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.The distinction is
>> a positivistic reliance on ambiguous criteria of utility for empirical
>> sciences as opposed to the tautological regression of empirical
>> observations to axioms for the so-called tautological sciences such as
>> math, logic, etc. However, it must be noted that in the tautological
>> sciences there is no further regression or tautological reduction of
>> empirical observations beyond axioms and axioms themselves must be
>> justified by appeals to intuitive correctness in a manner analogous to
>> justification for all empirical observations in empirical science.
>>
>> Now, however, let's see if there isn't some way to unite tautological
>> and empirical sciences on a common foundation through regression to
>> some criterion of truth in general. We begin by noting a common basis
>> for tautological regression or reduction in both kinds of science, the
>> ordinary or particular tautology t:[subject][not subject] to which all
>> empirical observations must be subject or they cannot be true.
>>
>> Further we note that alternatives to t:[subject][not subject] must
>> always be false, that t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject]
>> completes or perfects all possibilities in particular tautologies for
>> true and false. Now we need only ask what is it in tautologies which
>> can be proven to reduce to truth and falsity regardless of subject?
>>
>> --------
>>
>> We begin with the empirical observation [not] and find tautological
>> regression leads directly to [not not]. We find that T:[not][not not]
>> is not further reducible or regressible because it already contains
>> its own self contradiction and we infer from this that [not] is always
>> true and [not not] always false such that T:[not][not not] applies to
>> all tautologies based on empirical observations regardless of subject.
>>
>> Therefore [not] is true of all empirical observations and forms the
>> mechanical basis for all empirical observations of whatever nature
>> which can be true and [not not] the mechanical basis for all empirical
>> observations which are false.
>>
>> But what does the empirical observation [not] mean exactly?
>>
>> --------
>>
>> There are a couple of ways to address this question. I characterize
>> [not] as differences and [not not] as different from differences. We
>> could note that [not] might also be described as negation or some
>> equivalent, but the difficulty is that none of these characterizations
>> adds much more to the meaning of [not] than mere amplification.
>>
>> The difficulty is that we cannot further define [not] because [not] is
>> the mechanical basis of definition. And if we apply [not] to the
>> definition of [not] the result is self contradiction. We can apply
>> [not] between other results of [not] but we cannot gain further
>> insight to the nature of [not] itself through tautological reduction.
>>
>> --------
>>
>> The other part of the puzzle are the implications of [not] and what it
>> means in practice. Now the interesting thing here is that [not] has
>> every implication because it forms the basis in mechanical terms of
>> everything that can be true. But the other interesting aspect is that
>> I don't have to know what the implications of [not] are or have to be
>> in order to know that [not] is necessarily true of everything. That is
>> necessarily true because [not not] is necessarily self contradictory.
>>
>> As a practical matter it is possible to observe that [not] can apply
>> to the results of other [not]'s without self contradiction. In other
>> words, we cannot have different from differences but we can have
>> differences between differences, differences between differences
>> between differences, etc. as far as mechanical limitations allow
>> because there is no necessary self contradiction involved.
>>
>> --------
>>
>> (Conclusion)
>>
>> In summary we have differences in general as the mechanical basis for
>> everything that can be true and we have the potential for differences
>> between differences etc. as the mechanical basis for sentience and all
>> other forms of empirical observations which can be true. But we have
>> very little comprehension of what such things mean in practice.
>>
>> By way of a very loose analogy, let's suppose we might visualize [not]
>> or differences compounded in terms of one another as a three
>> dimensional tautological grid. And as long as we remain on it we can
>> transit the grid with every confidence that what we conclude is true
>> and not false. However, the moment we slip off the grid of differences
>> and differences between differences etc. we fall into the necessity of
>> self contradiction. So the only problem is transiting the grid and not
>> whether what we do is true or false as long as we remain on the grid.
>>
>> Regards - Lester
>
>Yeah, that's usually called "a complete theory": "An abstract logical
>theory in which all true statements have formal proofs within the
>theory."
>When we fall off such a grid, we do indeed fall into the necessity of
>self contradiction. The problem is that we don't know of any of those
>grids which always match empirical observation.
Well, patty, I appreciate your taking the time to critique the post.
I'm of the opinion that we do know of one of those grids, the only
possible one, for the reasons indicated. Certainly any grid which
doesn't rely on differences and differences between differences,
explicity or implicitly, cannot be true. At least the grid analogy is
understandable.
Regards - Lester
|
|
| | From: | patty | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 03 Jan 2005 19:51:13 GMT |
|
|
| Lester Zick wrote:
> On Mon, 03 Jan 2005 17:35:42 GMT, patty
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>
>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>
>>> Epistemology 102
>>> --------
>>>
>>> (Scientific Truth)
>>>
>>>Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
>>>things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
>>>practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
>>>its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
>>>
>>>This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
>>>defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
>>>observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
>>>opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
>>>They are also required to explain what they would deny because
>>>empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>>>
>>>Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
>>>of utility for science other than truth. We proposed one measure of
>>>utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
>>>non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
>>>circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
>>>However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
>>>
>>>For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
>>>not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
>>>complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
>>>of complexity is for any theory.
>>>
>>>Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
>>>an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
>>>utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
>>>utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
>>>
>>>The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
>>>simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
>>>No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
>>>science addresses things in different ways.
>>>
>>>For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
>>>f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
>>>and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
>>>foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
>>>sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
>>>approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
>>>we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
>>>
>>> --------
>>>
>>>We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
>>>the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
>>>truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
>>>by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
>>>pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
>>>The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
>>>merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
>>>
>>>However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
>>>empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
>>>cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
>>>are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
>>>form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
>>>other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
>>>could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
>>>which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
>>>
>>
>>... or no complete theory or empirical observations is always true ...
>>which assumption most of us gladly accept.
>
>
> Complacency is in fact one aspect of modern empiricism.
>
>
>>>Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
>>>merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
>>>itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
>>>this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
>>>empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
>>>geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
>>>
>>> --------
>>>
>>>Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
>>>in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
>>>in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.The distinction is
>>>a positivistic reliance on ambiguous criteria of utility for empirical
>>>sciences as opposed to the tautological regression of empirical
>>>observations to axioms for the so-called tautological sciences such as
>>>math, logic, etc. However, it must be noted that in the tautological
>>>sciences there is no further regression or tautological reduction of
>>>empirical observations beyond axioms and axioms themselves must be
>>>justified by appeals to intuitive correctness in a manner analogous to
>>>justification for all empirical observations in empirical science.
>>>
>>>Now, however, let's see if there isn't some way to unite tautological
>>>and empirical sciences on a common foundation through regression to
>>>some criterion of truth in general. We begin by noting a common basis
>>>for tautological regression or reduction in both kinds of science, the
>>>ordinary or particular tautology t:[subject][not subject] to which all
>>>empirical observations must be subject or they cannot be true.
>>>
>>>Further we note that alternatives to t:[subject][not subject] must
>>>always be false, that t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject]
>>>completes or perfects all possibilities in particular tautologies for
>>>true and false. Now we need only ask what is it in tautologies which
>>>can be proven to reduce to truth and falsity regardless of subject?
>>>
>>> --------
>>>
>>>We begin with the empirical observation [not] and find tautological
>>>regression leads directly to [not not]. We find that T:[not][not not]
>>>is not further reducible or regressible because it already contains
>>>its own self contradiction and we infer from this that [not] is always
>>>true and [not not] always false such that T:[not][not not] applies to
>>>all tautologies based on empirical observations regardless of subject.
>>>
>>>Therefore [not] is true of all empirical observations and forms the
>>>mechanical basis for all empirical observations of whatever nature
>>>which can be true and [not not] the mechanical basis for all empirical
>>>observations which are false.
>>>
>>>But what does the empirical observation [not] mean exactly?
>>>
>>> --------
>>>
>>>There are a couple of ways to address this question. I characterize
>>>[not] as differences and [not not] as different from differences. We
>>>could note that [not] might also be described as negation or some
>>>equivalent, but the difficulty is that none of these characterizations
>>>adds much more to the meaning of [not] than mere amplification.
>>>
>>>The difficulty is that we cannot further define [not] because [not] is
>>>the mechanical basis of definition. And if we apply [not] to the
>>>definition of [not] the result is self contradiction. We can apply
>>>[not] between other results of [not] but we cannot gain further
>>>insight to the nature of [not] itself through tautological reduction.
>>>
>>> --------
>>>
>>>The other part of the puzzle are the implications of [not] and what it
>>>means in practice. Now the interesting thing here is that [not] has
>>>every implication because it forms the basis in mechanical terms of
>>>everything that can be true. But the other interesting aspect is that
>>>I don't have to know what the implications of [not] are or have to be
>>>in order to know that [not] is necessarily true of everything. That is
>>>necessarily true because [not not] is necessarily self contradictory.
>>>
>>>As a practical matter it is possible to observe that [not] can apply
>>>to the results of other [not]'s without self contradiction. In other
>>>words, we cannot have different from differences but we can have
>>>differences between differences, differences between differences
>>>between differences, etc. as far as mechanical limitations allow
>>>because there is no necessary self contradiction involved.
>>>
>>> --------
>>>
>>> (Conclusion)
>>>
>>>In summary we have differences in general as the mechanical basis for
>>>everything that can be true and we have the potential for differences
>>>between differences etc. as the mechanical basis for sentience and all
>>>other forms of empirical observations which can be true. But we have
>>>very little comprehension of what such things mean in practice.
>>>
>>>By way of a very loose analogy, let's suppose we might visualize [not]
>>>or differences compounded in terms of one another as a three
>>>dimensional tautological grid. And as long as we remain on it we can
>>>transit the grid with every confidence that what we conclude is true
>>>and not false. However, the moment we slip off the grid of differences
>>>and differences between differences etc. we fall into the necessity of
>>>self contradiction. So the only problem is transiting the grid and not
>>>whether what we do is true or false as long as we remain on the grid.
>>>
>>>Regards - Lester
>>
>>Yeah, that's usually called "a complete theory": "An abstract logical
>>theory in which all true statements have formal proofs within the
>>theory."
>>When we fall off such a grid, we do indeed fall into the necessity of
>>self contradiction. The problem is that we don't know of any of those
>>grids which always match empirical observation.
>
>
> Well, patty, I appreciate your taking the time to critique the post.
> I'm of the opinion that we do know of one of those grids, the only
> possible one, for the reasons indicated. Certainly any grid which
> doesn't rely on differences and differences between differences,
> explicity or implicitly, cannot be true. At least the grid analogy is
> understandable.
>
> Regards - Lester
Well, perhaps i overstated a bit. It *is* conceivable that there is
some complete theory, or grid, based upon what you call "differences";
but that grid would so underdetermine empirical observation as to be
virtually useless, see "underdetermine"
. The problem is further
compounded by what you observed when you said " ... we have very little
comprehension of what such things [differences] mean in practice." So
what is the practical value of perusing it?
patty
|
|
| | From: | Lester Zick | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 03 Jan 2005 22:14:52 GMT |
|
|
| On Mon, 03 Jan 2005 19:51:13 GMT, patty
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Mon, 03 Jan 2005 17:35:42 GMT, patty
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>
>>>> Epistemology 102
>>>> --------
>>>>
>>>> (Scientific Truth)
>>>>
>>>>Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
>>>>things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
>>>>practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
>>>>its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
>>>>
>>>>This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
>>>>defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
>>>>observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
>>>>opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
>>>>They are also required to explain what they would deny because
>>>>empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>>>>
>>>>Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
>>>>of utility for science other than truth. We proposed one measure of
>>>>utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
>>>>non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
>>>>circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
>>>>However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
>>>>
>>>>For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
>>>>not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
>>>>complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
>>>>of complexity is for any theory.
>>>>
>>>>Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
>>>>an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
>>>>utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
>>>>utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
>>>>
>>>>The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
>>>>simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
>>>>No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
>>>>science addresses things in different ways.
>>>>
>>>>For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
>>>>f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
>>>>and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
>>>>foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
>>>>sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
>>>>approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
>>>>we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
>>>>
>>>> --------
>>>>
>>>>We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
>>>>the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
>>>>truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
>>>>by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
>>>>pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
>>>>The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
>>>>merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
>>>>
>>>>However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
>>>>empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
>>>>cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
>>>>are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
>>>>form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
>>>>other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
>>>>could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
>>>>which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
>>>>
>>>
>>>... or no complete theory or empirical observations is always true ...
>>>which assumption most of us gladly accept.
>>
>>
>> Complacency is in fact one aspect of modern empiricism.
>>
>>
>>>>Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
>>>>merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
>>>>itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
>>>>this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
>>>>empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
>>>>geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
>>>>
>>>> --------
>>>>
>>>>Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
>>>>in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
>>>>in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.The distinction is
>>>>a positivistic reliance on ambiguous criteria of utility for empirical
>>>>sciences as opposed to the tautological regression of empirical
>>>>observations to axioms for the so-called tautological sciences such as
>>>>math, logic, etc. However, it must be noted that in the tautological
>>>>sciences there is no further regression or tautological reduction of
>>>>empirical observations beyond axioms and axioms themselves must be
>>>>justified by appeals to intuitive correctness in a manner analogous to
>>>>justification for all empirical observations in empirical science.
>>>>
>>>>Now, however, let's see if there isn't some way to unite tautological
>>>>and empirical sciences on a common foundation through regression to
>>>>some criterion of truth in general. We begin by noting a common basis
>>>>for tautological regression or reduction in both kinds of science, the
>>>>ordinary or particular tautology t:[subject][not subject] to which all
>>>>empirical observations must be subject or they cannot be true.
>>>>
>>>>Further we note that alternatives to t:[subject][not subject] must
>>>>always be false, that t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject]
>>>>completes or perfects all possibilities in particular tautologies for
>>>>true and false. Now we need only ask what is it in tautologies which
>>>>can be proven to reduce to truth and falsity regardless of subject?
>>>>
>>>> --------
>>>>
>>>>We begin with the empirical observation [not] and find tautological
>>>>regression leads directly to [not not]. We find that T:[not][not not]
>>>>is not further reducible or regressible because it already contains
>>>>its own self contradiction and we infer from this that [not] is always
>>>>true and [not not] always false such that T:[not][not not] applies to
>>>>all tautologies based on empirical observations regardless of subject.
>>>>
>>>>Therefore [not] is true of all empirical observations and forms the
>>>>mechanical basis for all empirical observations of whatever nature
>>>>which can be true and [not not] the mechanical basis for all empirical
>>>>observations which are false.
>>>>
>>>>But what does the empirical observation [not] mean exactly?
>>>>
>>>> --------
>>>>
>>>>There are a couple of ways to address this question. I characterize
>>>>[not] as differences and [not not] as different from differences. We
>>>>could note that [not] might also be described as negation or some
>>>>equivalent, but the difficulty is that none of these characterizations
>>>>adds much more to the meaning of [not] than mere amplification.
>>>>
>>>>The difficulty is that we cannot further define [not] because [not] is
>>>>the mechanical basis of definition. And if we apply [not] to the
>>>>definition of [not] the result is self contradiction. We can apply
>>>>[not] between other results of [not] but we cannot gain further
>>>>insight to the nature of [not] itself through tautological reduction.
>>>>
>>>> --------
>>>>
>>>>The other part of the puzzle are the implications of [not] and what it
>>>>means in practice. Now the interesting thing here is that [not] has
>>>>every implication because it forms the basis in mechanical terms of
>>>>everything that can be true. But the other interesting aspect is that
>>>>I don't have to know what the implications of [not] are or have to be
>>>>in order to know that [not] is necessarily true of everything. That is
>>>>necessarily true because [not not] is necessarily self contradictory.
>>>>
>>>>As a practical matter it is possible to observe that [not] can apply
>>>>to the results of other [not]'s without self contradiction. In other
>>>>words, we cannot have different from differences but we can have
>>>>differences between differences, differences between differences
>>>>between differences, etc. as far as mechanical limitations allow
>>>>because there is no necessary self contradiction involved.
>>>>
>>>> --------
>>>>
>>>> (Conclusion)
>>>>
>>>>In summary we have differences in general as the mechanical basis for
>>>>everything that can be true and we have the potential for differences
>>>>between differences etc. as the mechanical basis for sentience and all
>>>>other forms of empirical observations which can be true. But we have
>>>>very little comprehension of what such things mean in practice.
>>>>
>>>>By way of a very loose analogy, let's suppose we might visualize [not]
>>>>or differences compounded in terms of one another as a three
>>>>dimensional tautological grid. And as long as we remain on it we can
>>>>transit the grid with every confidence that what we conclude is true
>>>>and not false. However, the moment we slip off the grid of differences
>>>>and differences between differences etc. we fall into the necessity of
>>>>self contradiction. So the only problem is transiting the grid and not
>>>>whether what we do is true or false as long as we remain on the grid.
>>>>
>>>>Regards - Lester
>>>
>>>Yeah, that's usually called "a complete theory": "An abstract logical
>>>theory in which all true statements have formal proofs within the
>>>theory."
>>>When we fall off such a grid, we do indeed fall into the necessity of
>>>self contradiction. The problem is that we don't know of any of those
>>>grids which always match empirical observation.
>>
>>
>> Well, patty, I appreciate your taking the time to critique the post.
>> I'm of the opinion that we do know of one of those grids, the only
>> possible one, for the reasons indicated. Certainly any grid which
>> doesn't rely on differences and differences between differences,
>> explicity or implicitly, cannot be true. At least the grid analogy is
>> understandable.
>>
>> Regards - Lester
>
>Well, perhaps i overstated a bit. It *is* conceivable that there is
>some complete theory, or grid, based upon what you call "differences";
>but that grid would so underdetermine empirical observation as to be
>virtually useless, see "underdetermine"
Well, it could certainly undermine positivist assumptions regarding
empirical observation. But I don't see how it undermines empirical
observation per se.
>. The problem is further
>compounded by what you observed when you said " ... we have very little
>comprehension of what such things [differences] mean in practice." So
>what is the practical value of perusing it?
One practical purpose is getting on the right path. Another lies in
the ability to address analytical issuess in science with confidence
that we can look at science through ideas of truth or falsity rather
than any ambiguous standard like utility. I know everyone argues
pragmatics as the standard of science. But whose pragmatics? Many
argue that pragmatics and utility are absolute then go on to adopt
ridiculous standards of pragmatics and utility they want to practice.
Regards - Lester
|
|
| | From: | Milan | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 3 Jan 2005 20:55:07 -0000 |
|
|
|
"Lester Zick" wrote in message
news:41d96416.25258564@netnews.att.net...
>
> Epistemology 102
> --------
>
> (Scientific Truth)
>
> Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
> things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
> practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
> its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
It relies on checking the predictions of a theory with the actual
observations.
> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
If nobody can replicate an observation then the observation tends to be
discredited and fall into oblivion.
> Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
> of utility for science other than truth.
First you talk about positivism, then about empiricism, now positivism
again. It's not clear what you are talking about.
>We proposed one measure of
> utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
> non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
> circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
> However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
>
> For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
> not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
> complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
> of complexity is for any theory.
>
> Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
> an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
> utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
> utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
>
> The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
> simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
> No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
> science addresses things in different ways.
By "utility" you mean verifiable? It is not clear what you mean by
"utility".
> For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
> f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
> and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
> foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
> sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
> approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
> we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
>
> --------
>
> We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
> the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
> truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
> by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
> pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
> The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
> merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
They are observations about the world. Such as "there is a cat in the
garden", or "water boils at 100C". You are confusing blank stares with eyes
rolling.
> However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
> empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
> cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
> are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
> form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
> other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
> could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
> which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
Some things are true sometimes. For instance the statement "there is a cat
in the garden" may be true now, but not when the cat leaves the garden.
> Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
> merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
> itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
> this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
> empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
> geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
>
You may find that; quite a few people disagree.
--------
>
> Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
> in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
> in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.
We dont have empirical observations in mathematics. Unless you refer to
statements such as "Nigel wrote an integral on the blackboard".
[snip meaningless drivel]
regards
Milan
|
|
| | From: | Lester Zick | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Mon, 03 Jan 2005 22:47:17 GMT |
|
|
| On Mon, 3 Jan 2005 20:55:07 -0000, "Milan" in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>"Lester Zick" wrote in message
>news:41d96416.25258564@netnews.att.net...
>>
>> Epistemology 102
>> --------
>>
>> (Scientific Truth)
>>
>> Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
>> things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
>> practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
>> its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
>
>It relies on checking the predictions of a theory with the actual
>observations.
I believe that's what I just said.
>> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
>> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
>> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
>> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
>> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
>> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>
>If nobody can replicate an observation then the observation tends to be
>discredited and fall into oblivion.
I believe that's what I just said.
>> Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
>> of utility for science other than truth.
>
>First you talk about positivism, then about empiricism, now positivism
>again. It's not clear what you are talking about.
Positivism is the progenitor of empiricism. Basically they amount to
the same thing, which unfortunately isn't a hill of beans.
>>We proposed one measure of
>> utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
>> non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
>> circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
>> However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
>>
>> For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
>> not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
>> complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
>> of complexity is for any theory.
>>
>> Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
>> an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
>> utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
>> utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
>>
>> The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
>> simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
>> No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
>> science addresses things in different ways.
>
>By "utility" you mean verifiable? It is not clear what you mean by
>"utility".
No, I don't mean verifiable because in positivism/empiricism
observations can't be verified; they can only be invalidated through
self contradiction. Now, if you want to know what I mean by utility, I
suggest you review Epistemology 101 where it was clearly explained.
>> For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
>> f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
>> and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
>> foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
>> sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
>> approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
>> we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
>>
>> --------
>>
>> We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
>> the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
>> truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
>> by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
>> pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
>> The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
>> merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
>
>They are observations about the world. Such as "there is a cat in the
>garden", or "water boils at 100C". You are confusing blank stares with eyes
>rolling.
Certainly I'm not confusing your blank stares with anything but
ignorance. I love your definition of empirical observations as
observations about the world. So insightful. Your analogies with a
cat in the garden or the boiling point of water are especially helpful
as well. No doubt Webster's will be in touch.
>> However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
>> empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
>> cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
>> are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
>> form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
>> other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
>> could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
>> which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
>
>Some things are true sometimes. For instance the statement "there is a cat
>in the garden" may be true now, but not when the cat leaves the garden.
So, the statement that "some things are true sometimes", is that an
emprical observation? My brain is beginning to hurt.
>> Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
>> merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
>> itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
>> this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
>> empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
>> geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
>>
>
>You may find that; quite a few people disagree.
I find that when asked to explain what they think, quite a few people
don't know what they think.
> --------
>>
>> Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
>> in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
>> in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.
>
>We dont have empirical observations in mathematics. Unless you refer to
>statements such as "Nigel wrote an integral on the blackboard".
This is hardly a statement in mathematics, sport. It's an empirical
observation. It's mathematical mystics like you who give bullshit
artists a bad name. Take a couple more stupid pills and call me in the
morning. Or rather don't call me in the morning.
Regards - Lester
|
|
| | From: | Milan | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Tue, 4 Jan 2005 00:56:48 -0000 |
|
|
|
"Lester Zick" wrote in message
news:41d9c6fa.36109700@netnews.att.net...
> On Mon, 3 Jan 2005 20:55:07 -0000, "Milan" in
> comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
> >
> >"Lester Zick" wrote in message
> >news:41d96416.25258564@netnews.att.net...
> >>
> >> Epistemology 102
> >> --------
> >>
> >> (Scientific Truth)
> >>
> >> Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
> >> things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
> >> practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
> >> its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
> >
> >It relies on checking the predictions of a theory with the actual
> >observations.
>
> I believe that's what I just said.
I believe your pedantic jargon is not the one usually employed in philosophy
of science. I was just trying to clarify the point.
> >> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
> >> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
> >> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
> >> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
> >> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
> >> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
> >
> >If nobody can replicate an observation then the observation tends to be
> >discredited and fall into oblivion.
>
> I believe that's what I just said.
You believe wrong. Nobody is "reduced to disproving observations". If they
cant replicate them after a number of attempts they just move on.
> >> Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
> >> of utility for science other than truth.
> >
> >First you talk about positivism, then about empiricism, now positivism
> >again. It's not clear what you are talking about.
>
> Positivism is the progenitor of empiricism. Basically they amount to
> the same thing, which unfortunately isn't a hill of beans.
LOL. Empiricism can be traced to Locke and Hume. Positivism emerges in the
1920s with the Vienna Circle etc.
> >>We proposed one measure of
> >> utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
> >> non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
> >> circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
> >> However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
> >>
> >> For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
> >> not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
> >> complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
> >> of complexity is for any theory.
> >>
> >> Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
> >> an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
> >> utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
> >> utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
> >>
> >> The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
> >> simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
> >> No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
> >> science addresses things in different ways.
> >
> >By "utility" you mean verifiable? It is not clear what you mean by
> >"utility".
>
> No, I don't mean verifiable because in positivism/empiricism
> observations can't be verified; they can only be invalidated through
> self contradiction. Now, if you want to know what I mean by utility, I
> suggest you review Epistemology 101 where it was clearly explained.
The positivists with AJ Ayer et al introduced the verifiability principle.
It was Popper who came up with falsificationism. You are confused. Your
Epistemology 101 posts are a mish-mash of ignorance and confusion. Nothing
is clearly explained there.
> >> For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
> >> f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
> >> and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
> >> foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
> >> sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
> >> approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
> >> we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
> >>
> >> --------
> >>
> >> We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
> >> the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
> >> truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
> >> by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
> >> pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
> >> The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
> >> merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
> >
> >They are observations about the world. Such as "there is a cat in the
> >garden", or "water boils at 100C". You are confusing blank stares with
eyes
> >rolling.
>
> Certainly I'm not confusing your blank stares with anything but
> ignorance. I love your definition of empirical observations as
> observations about the world. So insightful. Your analogies with a
> cat in the garden or the boiling point of water are especially helpful
> as well. No doubt Webster's will be in touch.
I was just trying to help. You obviously have no idea what you are talking
about.
> >> However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
> >> empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
> >> cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
> >> are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
> >> form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
> >> other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
> >> could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
> >> which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
> >
> >Some things are true sometimes. For instance the statement "there is a
cat
> >in the garden" may be true now, but not when the cat leaves the garden.
>
> So, the statement that "some things are true sometimes", is that an
> emprical observation? My brain is beginning to hurt.
Your brain is numb. I doubt it hurts.
> >> Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
> >> merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
> >> itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
> >> this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
> >> empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
> >> geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
> >>
> >
> >You may find that; quite a few people disagree.
>
> I find that when asked to explain what they think, quite a few people
> don't know what they think.
Fortunately they have you to enlighten them.
> > --------
> >>
> >> Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
> >> in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
> >> in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.
> >
> >We dont have empirical observations in mathematics. Unless you refer to
> >statements such as "Nigel wrote an integral on the blackboard".
>
> This is hardly a statement in mathematics, sport. It's an empirical
> observation. It's mathematical mystics like you who give bullshit
> artists a bad name. Take a couple more stupid pills and call me in the
> morning. Or rather don't call me in the morning.
Why dont you stick your bullshit up your ass instead of spewing all over
this ng, you retard?
regards
Milan
> Regards - Lester
|
|
| | From: | Lester Zick | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Tue, 04 Jan 2005 17:12:36 GMT |
|
|
| On Tue, 4 Jan 2005 00:56:48 -0000, "Milan" in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>"Lester Zick" wrote in message
>news:41d9c6fa.36109700@netnews.att.net...
>> On Mon, 3 Jan 2005 20:55:07 -0000, "Milan" in
>> comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >"Lester Zick" wrote in message
>> >news:41d96416.25258564@netnews.att.net...
>> >>
>> >> Epistemology 102
>> >> --------
>> >>
>> >> (Scientific Truth)
>> >>
>> >> Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies certain
>> >> things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
>> >> practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
>> >> its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
>> >
>> >It relies on checking the predictions of a theory with the actual
>> >observations.
>>
>> I believe that's what I just said.
>
>I believe your pedantic jargon is not the one usually employed in philosophy
>of science. I was just trying to clarify the point.
So what kind of pedantic jargon do you prefer?
>> >> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
>> >> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
>> >> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
>> >> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
>> >> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
>> >> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
>> >
>> >If nobody can replicate an observation then the observation tends to be
>> >discredited and fall into oblivion.
>>
>> I believe that's what I just said.
>
>You believe wrong. Nobody is "reduced to disproving observations". If they
>cant replicate them after a number of attempts they just move on.
Or if they don't understand what they're disproving they just resort
to cant.
>> >> Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some standard
>> >> of utility for science other than truth.
>> >
>> >First you talk about positivism, then about empiricism, now positivism
>> >again. It's not clear what you are talking about.
>>
>> Positivism is the progenitor of empiricism. Basically they amount to
>> the same thing, which unfortunately isn't a hill of beans.
>
>LOL. Empiricism can be traced to Locke and Hume. Positivism emerges in the
>1920s with the Vienna Circle etc.
Gee, that online reference to Pierre Auguste Comte and positivism
that I read must have been erroneous. Not to mention contributions
of Aristotle. I think you really need to be correcting the history of
philosophy on such points and not merely lil ole me. Various others
have been referring to logical positivism and not myself except in
reply to them. You might really consider learning to read what is
written before you reply.
>> >>We proposed one measure of
>> >> utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of mutually
>> >> non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
>> >> circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories, U=1/NC.
>> >> However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
>> >>
>> >> For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity is
>> >> not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is more
>> >> complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the degree
>> >> of complexity is for any theory.
>> >>
>> >> Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself represents
>> >> an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
>> >> utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards of
>> >> utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
>> >>
>> >> The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
>> >> simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
>> >> No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
>> >> science addresses things in different ways.
>> >
>> >By "utility" you mean verifiable? It is not clear what you mean by
>> >"utility".
>>
>> No, I don't mean verifiable because in positivism/empiricism
>> observations can't be verified; they can only be invalidated through
>> self contradiction. Now, if you want to know what I mean by utility, I
>> suggest you review Epistemology 101 where it was clearly explained.
>
>The positivists with AJ Ayer et al introduced the verifiability principle.
>It was Popper who came up with falsificationism. You are confused. Your
>Epistemology 101 posts are a mish-mash of ignorance and confusion. Nothing
>is clearly explained there.
Thanks for the clarification. I had no idea that positivism was quite
the twentieth century phenom you make it out to be. I stand corrected.
>> >> For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
>> >> f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
>> >> and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
>> >> foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
>> >> sciences which just claim different standards of utility because their
>> >> approaches to the subject are different and judge different data. And
>> >> we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
>> >>
>> >> --------
>> >>
>> >> We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests on
>> >> the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove the
>> >> truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is meant
>> >> by an empirical observation, we are met with blank stares and fingers
>> >> pointing in various directions plus some middle fingers pointing up.
>> >> The most promising consensus suggests that empirical observations are
>> >> merely those which are not or cannot be proven tautologically.
>> >
>> >They are observations about the world. Such as "there is a cat in the
>> >garden", or "water boils at 100C". You are confusing blank stares with
>eyes
>> >rolling.
>>
>> Certainly I'm not confusing your blank stares with anything but
>> ignorance. I love your definition of empirical observations as
>> observations about the world. So insightful. Your analogies with a
>> cat in the garden or the boiling point of water are especially helpful
>> as well. No doubt Webster's will be in touch.
>
>I was just trying to help. You obviously have no idea what you are talking
>about.
Well, I obviously have no idea what you're talking about. The question
is do you have any idea what you're talking about.Thanks for the help.
>> >> However I would like to add that even though not proven tautologically
>> >> empirical observations must be subject to tautological proof or they
>> >> cannot be true whatever else they may be. The reason is tautologies
>> >> are themselves always true. That is, if we take any tautology of the
>> >> form t:[subject][not subject] the truth must be found with one or the
>> >> other part of the tautology. Consequently, if empirical observations
>> >> could not form parts of tautologies, they would lie outside something
>> >> which is always true and thus could not themselves be true.
>> >
>> >Some things are true sometimes. For instance the statement "there is a
>cat
>> >in the garden" may be true now, but not when the cat leaves the garden.
>>
>> So, the statement that "some things are true sometimes", is that an
>> emprical observation? My brain is beginning to hurt.
>
>Your brain is numb. I doubt it hurts.
Oh, given the level of your pedantic jargon and cant, I find that it
can and does.
>> >> Based on this insight, we conclude that empirical observations are
>> >> merely the positive part of any tautology whether or not the tautology
>> >> itself is used to prove the truth of the empirical observation. And in
>> >> this regard we find that there is no fundamental distinction between
>> >> empirical observations and those observations, such as mathematical,
>> >> geometric, or logical which are subject to proof as true or false.
>> >>
>> >
>> >You may find that; quite a few people disagree.
>>
>> I find that when asked to explain what they think, quite a few people
>> don't know what they think.
>
>Fortunately they have you to enlighten them.
Or yourself.
>> > --------
>> >>
>> >> Now, all this is fairly straightforward.We have empirical observations
>> >> in mathematics and the so-called tautological sciences just as we have
>> >> in the so-called empirical or experimental sciences.
>> >
>> >We dont have empirical observations in mathematics. Unless you refer to
>> >statements such as "Nigel wrote an integral on the blackboard".
>>
>> This is hardly a statement in mathematics, sport. It's an empirical
>> observation. It's mathematical mystics like you who give bullshit
>> artists a bad name. Take a couple more stupid pills and call me in the
>> morning. Or rather don't call me in the morning.
>
>Why dont you stick your bullshit up your ass instead of spewing all over
>this ng, you retard?
Yes, yes, I can see the error of my ways already. Perhaps I should
switch to the same brand of stupid pills you take. Then you could get
back to listening to the music of the spheres for your inspiration and
insight on the history of positivism.
Regards - Lester
|
|
| | From: | Milan | | Subject: | Re: Epistemology 102 | | Date: | Tue, 4 Jan 2005 22:19:36 -0000 |
|
|
|
"Lester Zick" wrote in message
news:41dac9db.40429315@netnews.att.net...
> On Tue, 4 Jan 2005 00:56:48 -0000, "Milan" in
> comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
> >
> >"Lester Zick" wrote in message
> >news:41d9c6fa.36109700@netnews.att.net...
> >> On Mon, 3 Jan 2005 20:55:07 -0000, "Milan" in
> >> comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
> >>
> >> >
> >> >"Lester Zick" wrote in message
> >> >news:41d96416.25258564@netnews.att.net...
> >> >>
> >> >> Epistemology 102
> >> >> --------
> >> >>
> >> >> (Scientific Truth)
> >> >>
> >> >> Last semester, boys and girls, we saw that positivism implies
certain
> >> >> things in relation to empirical knowledge. We found that science as
> >> >> practiced in modern empiricist form relies on self contradiction for
> >> >> its one standard of falsification and has no other test for truth.
> >> >
> >> >It relies on checking the predictions of a theory with the actual
> >> >observations.
> >>
> >> I believe that's what I just said.
> >
> >I believe your pedantic jargon is not the one usually employed in
philosophy
> >of science. I was just trying to clarify the point.
>
> So what kind of pedantic jargon do you prefer?
None, really. And yours less.
> >> >> This means in turn that empiricism places the burden of proof on the
> >> >> defense rather than the prosecution. Those who deny any empirical
> >> >> observation are effectively reduced to disproving the observation as
> >> >> opposed to the empirical observer's having to prove the observation.
> >> >> They are also required to explain what they would deny because
> >> >> empirical observations in general could mean anything.
> >> >
> >> >If nobody can replicate an observation then the observation tends to
be
> >> >discredited and fall into oblivion.
> >>
> >> I believe that's what I just said.
> >
> >You believe wrong. Nobody is "reduced to disproving observations". If
they
> >cant replicate them after a number of attempts they just move on.
>
> Or if they don't understand what they're disproving they just resort
> to cant.
Silly answer. Ignored.
> >> >> Further we found that positivism effectively substitutes some
standard
> >> >> of utility for science other than truth.
> >> >
> >> >First you talk about positivism, then about empiricism, now positivism
> >> >again. It's not clear what you are talking about.
> >>
> >> Positivism is the progenitor of empiricism. Basically they amount to
> >> the same thing, which unfortunately isn't a hill of beans.
> >
> >LOL. Empiricism can be traced to Locke and Hume. Positivism emerges in
the
> >1920s with the Vienna Circle etc.
>
> Gee, that online reference to Pierre Auguste Comte and positivism
> that I read must have been erroneous. Not to mention contributions
> of Aristotle. I think you really need to be correcting the history of
> philosophy on such points and not merely lil ole me. Various others
> have been referring to logical positivism and not myself except in
> reply to them. You might really consider learning to read what is
> written before you reply.
You are a funny chap, I give you that. Both Locke and Hume were dead before
Comte was born. I left out Aristotle because empiricism is usually
associated with Locke and Hume more than with anybody else. But, of
course,if you count Aristotle your post was even more wrong. Unless you
think that Aristotle was a positivist. I wouldn't be surprised if you did.
> >> >>We proposed one measure of
> >> >> utility in the form of a reciprocal product of the number of
mutually
> >> >> non self contradictory theories needed to comprehend any historical
> >> >> circumstances, times the average complexity of those theories,
U=1/NC.
> >> >> However, we now find that there are problems with any such measure.
> >> >>
> >> >> For example, the measure is itself reasonably clear. Yet complexity
is
> >> >> not really all that easy to measure. We can see when something is
more
> >> >> complex than something else. But we cannot easily see what the
degree
> >> >> of complexity is for any theory.
> >> >>
> >> >> Even beyond this, however, any criterion of utility itself
represents
> >> >> an empirical observation subject to identical considerations of
> >> >> utility as well. Which means that anyone can claim other standards
of
> >> >> utility and we would have no way to judge among them definitively.
> >> >>
> >> >> The way this works in practice is that various forms of empiricism
> >> >> simply claim they are judging utility according to different data.
> >> >> No one denies the general idea of utility; they just say that their
> >> >> science addresses things in different ways.
> >> >
> >> >By "utility" you mean verifiable? It is not clear what you mean by
> >> >"utility".
> >>
> >> No, I don't mean verifiable because in positivism/empiricism
> >> observations can't be verified; they can only be invalidated through
> >> self contradiction. Now, if you want to know what I mean by utility, I
> >> suggest you review Epistemology 101 where it was clearly explained.
> >
> >The positivists with AJ Ayer et al introduced the verifiability
principle.
> >It was Popper who came up with falsificationism. You are confused. Your
> >Epistemology 101 posts are a mish-mash of ignorance and confusion.
Nothing
> >is clearly explained there.
>
> Thanks for the clarification. I had no idea that positivism was quite
> the twentieth century phenom you make it out to be. I stand corrected.
You're welcome.
> >> >> For example, classical mechanics primary foundation rested on
> >> >> f=ma and various derivatives. Then came along various relativistic
> >> >> and quantum effects said to rest on other unspecified mechanical
> >> >> foundations. Or consider the different approaches to behavioral
> >> >> sciences which just claim different standards of utility because
their
> >> >> approaches to the subject are different and judge different data.
And
> >> >> we have no unambiguous way to judge the standards in themselves.
> >> >>
> >> >> --------
> >> >>
> >> >> We also note in passing that positivism's approach to science rests
on
> >> >> the somewhat suspicious foundation of a general inability to prove
the
> >> >> truth of any empirical observation. However, when we ask what is
meant
> >> >> by an empirical observation, |
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