Epistemology 101
----------

(Positivism)

Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
one must judge value.

Of course all sciences judge truth in terms of self contradiction, the
falsification of empirical observation through empirical observation.
However with no ability to judge truth in absolute terms, there is no
model of reality in general with which to judge empirical observations
in general without reference to other empirical observations.

This is a very tedious and cumbersome process which yields no further
indication of cause one way or the other and forces us to invalidate
empirical observations without gaining further insight as to what may
be true. In other words, it shows what is false but not what is true
of one thing in relation to others. For further insight we are forced
to rely on educated guesses rather than causation or instrumentality.

The curious thing about this is that empirical observations are
neither true nor false in themselves; they are only true or false in
relation to other things. Any empirical observation can only be taken
as true in the absence of self contradiction through other empirical
observations and we cannot otherwise know that they are false.

However we cannot know the reverse: that any empirical observation is
false without evidence of self contradiction. Consequently empirical
observers are in the enviable position of not having to prove what
they say is true or even necessarily understand what it is that they
are saying in order to assert that it is not false. Whereas naysayers
are in the rather awkward position of having to know what empiricists
are talking about is not true and why.

Strangely enough in positivism it turns out that the burden of proof
is on the negativist not the positivist.

(Positivist Forensic Techniques)

This means that we are faced with a negativism in science where
empiricsts do not have to prove truth but naysayers have to prove
falsity. Consider a certain forensic technique. Empiricist A asserts
observation B as not false because there is no mechanical standard of
reality in general against which to judge the truth of B. Naysayer X
wishes to argue against B but is forced to demand from A the meaning
of B. And if A recognizes what he is up against, he merely replies B
is whatever he says it is as long as B is not self contradictory. And
even if in conflict with other empirical observations, A can change B.

Naysayer X is thus stymied unless he in turn appeals to philosophy
rather than science to decide the issue. He must counter B with some
ad hoc rationale designed to exclude certain interpretations of B.

Consider the problem of mentation or the mind and mental effects
posited as causes for sentient behavior. I opine that mentation is a
cause of human behavior. And the typical materialist is immediately
driven to demand what I mean by mentation or the mind and mental
effects. Of course, I cleverly evade being pinned down so as to avoid
the numerous traps laid for the unwary by materialists on this
particular subject and simply decline to answer, recognizing that it
is the naysayer's responsibility for knowing what he is denying and
not mine for knowing what I am asserting simply because I have no way
to know what I am asserting in the absence of any universal frame of
reference for reality in mechanical terms.

In order to deny mentation, materialists have to construct a whole
series of philosophical rationales with which preclude mentation on
more or less plausible terms so they can claim contradiction of any
mentalist interpretation of behavior even in speculative terms.

Does this seem unfair? Yes I would certainly agree that it is. However
this is the way science has to be conducted in positivism with the
doctrinal absence of any definitive view of reality. Physics suffers
from this peculiar miasma almost completely and mathematics to the
extent it has no mechanical ontology to support its axioms.

The reason is that there are two kinds of processes involved: emprical
and logical. Empirical observations just represent positive judgments.
Logical inference on the other hand represent negations of positive
judgments compounded in various ways.

In effect empirical observation is the out-there and logical inference
the in-here. This is true regardless of where empirical observation
actually occurs. We could have empirical observation within the brain,
but we cannot have logical inference outside the brain or comparable
organ. The reason is that to the extent negation occurs, it is defined
and circumscribed by the mechanics of negation and to the extent
negation is not what is out-there, it must be in-here.

------------------

Let's examine certain consequences of this view of epistemology.
Without any overall view of reality that allows us to judge empirical
observation directly in positive terms, absent self contradiction, we
are forced to rely on an assumption of not false which means naysayers
are forced to provide evidence of contradiction and to provide
evidence of meaning in terms of what contradicts what.

This kind of epistemology is called positivism. Positivism knows it
cannot judge empirical observations in terms of absolute truth; so, it
relies on educated guesses and the absence of self contradiction as a
substitute for truth. And naysayers are required to produce either
absolute truth or evidence of meaning and self contradiction.

So far we are on good positivistic grounds. However, now a curious
problems emerges. How are we to judge the significance of empirical
truth? In the absence of self contradiction we are just forced to rely
on some judgment of value instead of truth. Empiricist B maintains
that such and such is true of behavior but actually bases the merit of
his claims on some form of pragmatic utility or what works instead. He
has to because as positivists everywhere understand he can't prove his
speculative observations are actually true.

Regards - Lester

From:	robert j. kolker
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 01:54:25 GMT

Lester Zick wrote:

> Epistemology 101
> ----------
>
> (Positivism)
>
> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
> the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
> idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
> one must judge value.

Some facts are so manifest they can be decided by the Mark One Eyeball.
Do you have a five dollar bill in your wallet? Take a look and see.
What's in yer wallet?

Bob Kolker

From:	Neil W Rickert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 03:21:25 +0000 (UTC)

"robert j. kolker" writes:
>Lester Zick wrote:

>> Epistemology 101
>> ----------

>> (Positivism)

>> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>> the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>> idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
>> one must judge value.

>Some facts are so manifest they can be decided by the Mark One Eyeball.
>Do you have a five dollar bill in your wallet? Take a look and see.
>What's in yer wallet?

You sweep all of the problems under the rug.

From:	Albert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Sun, 26 Dec 2004 21:24:20 -0600

robert j. kolker wrote:
>
>
> Lester Zick wrote:
>
>> Epistemology 101
>> ----------
>>
>> (Positivism)
>>
>> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>> the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>> idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
>> one must judge value.
>
>
> Some facts are so manifest they can be decided by the Mark One Eyeball.
> Do you have a five dollar bill in your wallet? Take a look and see.
> What's in yer wallet?

(1) Ask Neo while in the Matrix.

(2) Take a look and see what's in a photon.

As Lester says: "one is forced to fall back on the idea of utility"

--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"

From:	Pierre-Normand Houle
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Sun, 26 Dec 2004 23:38:42 -0500

"Albert" wrote in message news:roKzd.16006$ql2.6967@okepread04...
> robert j. kolker wrote:
> >
> >
> > Lester Zick wrote:
> >
> >> Epistemology 101
> >> ----------
> >>
> >> (Positivism)
> >>
> >> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
> >> the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
> >> idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
> >> one must judge value.
> >
> >
> > Some facts are so manifest they can be decided by the Mark One Eyeball.
> > Do you have a five dollar bill in your wallet? Take a look and see.
> > What's in yer wallet?
>
> (1) Ask Neo while in the Matrix.

It might not be possible for one to rationally entertain such skeptical
possibilities as that one be a brain in a vat or alternatively that one be
a spirit who is being deceived by a Cartesian demon into thinking
there is an external world. I mean this quite apart from the philosophical
problem of finding criteria for attributing mental states to such things
as disembodied spirits or brains which do not have an animal form
of life : one could instead imagine that one's whole body and environment
are being simulated on some supercomputer.

But if such scenario were actual (per impossibile) then everything that
I "seem" to see in my world would be part of the simulation. Let's call
this my phenomenal world. Then the wallet, the dollar bills that it contains,
but also my own body, and even my own (phenomenal) brain, (if I were to
see scans of it in a medical imagery lab,) would all be part of that simulated
world. We can imagine an evil scientist, (the Matrix architect, maybe,) who
can also monitor what happen in my phenomenal world through
a computer screen displaying choosen features the simulation.

But now there seems to be two "me"s : There is my phenomenal self,
the one who appears to others (and to my phenomenal self itself) in the
simulation. This is the one that the evil scientist can also see through his
computer screen. And then there is what I could call, after Kant,
my "noumenal" self. This is my brain in the vat or a separate computer
simulating the "behavior" of my brain. The Kantian point would be that
if there is no way for me to know *anything* about my noumenal self, then
there is not even any way to *think* about it. A fortiori, I cannot entertain
the skeptical possibility that I am a brain in a vat since this would involve my
predicating empirical concepts ("brain", "vat", "computer", etc.) to what
belongs to the unknowable, unthinkable, noumenal world that I try to picture
beyond the simulation.

But lest this failure of imagination of my phenomenal self not appear
convincing (or a real threat to the skeptical argument,) consider what the
relation is between what happens in the phenomenal world and what happens
in the noumenal world. This ought to show that the brain in the vat (or the
computer simulating the functioning of my brain) cannot even be the subject
and agent of my thoughts, perceptions, actions, etc.

That is, we naïvely assume that, in such setup, what subjectively happens
to my simulated self (perceptions, entertaining qualias, feeling emotions, etc.)
is mirrored, or identical with, what happens to the computer simulating
my brain. After all, this computer is postulated to be functionally identical
to the brain in my skull, and functionalists think of brains (or functional aspects
of it) to be genuine mental states. Isn't the computer then "having" thoses states?

However it should seem clear that the speed of the simulation as witnessed
by the scientist is irrelevant to my phenomenology qua simulated character.
That is, the scientists can double the frequency of the computer clock and
see me and my simulated world operating at double speed but "myself"
(my-phenomenal-self) wouldn't notice anything in this variation of speed
of the "simulation." Indeed, if the simulated world is deterministic, the simulation
could go in reverse. The scientist would see me walking and talking backwards
on his monitors but surely, "I" wouldn't notice anything. Indeed, after having
ran the simulation backwards for a while, the scientist could turn it forward
again and I would go on doing my things (again) blissfully ignorant of this
"noumenal" anomaly.

But if the speed at which computational states physically follow each other is irrelevant
to what *I* experience (the content of my mental states,) then, indeed, the order
in which they are computed seems also irrelevant. But then, isn't the *fact*
that the computation is performed at all also irrelevant? The relation "I"
(my phenomenal self) and my phenomenal world (content of the simulation)
have with the noumenal world is rather like the relation between the number
Pi and a computer which is computing Pi's decimals. There is such a thing
as the order in which the decimals of Pi are ordered but this can be quite independent
from order in which a computer is programmed to churns out the corresponding
numerals.

Another (more general) consideration: What determines what occurs in my world
depends on the (phenomenal) laws governing natural happening and the working
of my body. And this is reflected in the norms (the program) governing
the simulation on the computer of the evil scientist. It is quite distinct from
the laws operating in his world, and governing the functioning of his hardware,
which could be quite different. So we could say that, even if the scientist has
my world disclosed to him through his simulating it and observing features of
it on his computer screen, nevertheless, the computer (or any part of it, including
the simulation of the working of "my" brain) isn't a character in my world.

From:	Albert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 10:09:05 -0600

Pierre-Normand Houle wrote:
> "Albert" wrote in message news:roKzd.16006$ql2.6967@okepread04...
>
>>robert j. kolker wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>Lester Zick wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> Epistemology 101
>>>> ----------
>>>>
>>>> (Positivism)
>>>>
>>>>Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>>>>the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>>>>idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
>>>>one must judge value.
>>>
>>>
>>>Some facts are so manifest they can be decided by the Mark One Eyeball.
>>>Do you have a five dollar bill in your wallet? Take a look and see.
>>>What's in yer wallet?
>>
>>(1) Ask Neo while in the Matrix.
>
>
> It might not be possible for one to rationally entertain such skeptical
> possibilities as that one be a brain in a vat or alternatively that one be
> a spirit who is being deceived by a Cartesian demon into thinking
> there is an external world.

I enjoyed your very interesting reply. However, I think that you
might have quite missed the point. Neither 'a brain in a vat'
nor 'a Cartesian demon' were the real issue, especially your
implication that those were the only two options.

We often see only what we /expect/ to see; And there is much,
especially in the subatomic world, that is not directly
/observable/ at all.

--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"

From:	Pierre-Normand Houle
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:10:09 -0500

"Albert" wrote in message news:oBVzd.16014$ql2.11614@okepread04...
> Pierre-Normand Houle wrote:
> > "Albert" wrote in message news:roKzd.16006$ql2.6967@okepread04...
> >
> >>robert j. kolker wrote:
> >>
> >>>
> >>>Lester Zick wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> Epistemology 101
> >>>> ----------
> >>>>
> >>>> (Positivism)
> >>>>
> >>>>Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
> >>>>the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
> >>>>idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
> >>>>one must judge value.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>Some facts are so manifest they can be decided by the Mark One Eyeball.
> >>>Do you have a five dollar bill in your wallet? Take a look and see.
> >>>What's in yer wallet?
> >>
> >>(1) Ask Neo while in the Matrix.
> >
> >
> > It might not be possible for one to rationally entertain such skeptical
> > possibilities as that one be a brain in a vat or alternatively that one be
> > a spirit who is being deceived by a Cartesian demon into thinking
> > there is an external world.
>
>
>
> I enjoyed your very interesting reply. However, I think that you
> might have quite missed the point. Neither 'a brain in a vat'
> nor 'a Cartesian demon' were the real issue, especially your
> implication that those were the only two options.
>
> We often see only what we /expect/ to see; And there is much,
> especially in the subatomic world, that is not directly
> /observable/ at all.

Sorry, I did not mean to address your number (2) at all. That's why
I snipped it in my reply. I only wanted to comment on the skeptical
point raised by the Matrix analogy. And even that wasn't meant as a
foolproof refutation of external world skepticism. I just tried to bring
to the fore some Cartesian assumptions on the relation between mind
and world that are shared by many skeptical arguments.

From:	Onar Åm
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 5 Jan 2005 22:26:34 +0100

"Pierre-Normand Houle" wrote in message
news:nlMzd.2115$%k.603251@weber.videotron.net...
> "Albert" wrote in message
news:roKzd.16006$ql2.6967@okepread04...
> > robert j. kolker wrote:

> But if the speed at which computational states physically follow each other is
irrelevant
> to what *I* experience (the content of my mental states,) then, indeed, the
order
> in which they are computed seems also irrelevant. But then, isn't the *fact*
> that the computation is performed at all also irrelevant? The relation "I"
> (my phenomenal self) and my phenomenal world (content of the simulation)
> have with the noumenal world is rather like the relation between the number
> Pi and a computer which is computing Pi's decimals. There is such a thing
> as the order in which the decimals of Pi are ordered but this can be quite
independent
> from order in which a computer is programmed to churns out the corresponding
> numerals.
>
> Another (more general) consideration: What determines what occurs in my world
> depends on the (phenomenal) laws governing natural happening and the working
> of my body. And this is reflected in the norms (the program) governing
> the simulation on the computer of the evil scientist. It is quite distinct
from
> the laws operating in his world, and governing the functioning of his
hardware,
> which could be quite different. So we could say that, even if the scientist
has
> my world disclosed to him through his simulating it and observing features of
> it on his computer screen, nevertheless, the computer (or any part of it,
including
> the simulation of the working of "my" brain) isn't a character in my world.

I think your line of reasoning is a good one, but by merely considering ontology
you miss out on a crucial argument that strengthens your position against
skepticism, and that is the notion of _morality_. Moral is about the principles
of _value_, and in your argument you leave out the value aspects of your
position. Put crudely your argument boils down to this:

Since the hypothetical simulation has not impact on your life, you disregard it.

But WHY do you disregard it? What is the imperative to disregard something just
because it does not matter to you? The key is that it DOES NOT MATTER TO YOU,
i.e. the skeptical fantasy has no VALUE to you, other than as an amusing mind
game for bored philosophers that have nothing better to do with their life. My
point is that your rejection of skepticism rests on a moral premise, namely that
you value Life, your own existence as you know it. Thus, rejecting skepticism is
a moral issue more than an ontological one. This becomes much clearer the very
moment you try to follow through the logical conclusions of skepticism:
"weeeell, if reality is just an illusion, then we don't have to care about what
happens to us, we need not value ourselves, our destiny, our future, our being,
because it is all just a figment of someone's imagination. We can do what we
want to ourselves and to others, 'cause it's all an illusion." We reject
skepticism by taking our life and our existence seriously and placing _value_ on
it.

Onar.

From:	Pierre-Normand Houle
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Thu, 6 Jan 2005 14:28:37 -0500

"Onar Åm" wrote in message

> > Another (more general) consideration: What determines what occurs in my world
> > depends on the (phenomenal) laws governing natural happening and the working
> > of my body. And this is reflected in the norms (the program) governing
> > the simulation on the computer of the evil scientist. It is quite distinct from
> > the laws operating in his world, and governing the functioning of his hardware,
> > which could be quite different. So we could say that, even if the scientist has
> > my world disclosed to him through his simulating it and observing features of
> > it on his computer screen, nevertheless, the computer (or any part of it, including
> > the simulation of the working of "my" brain) isn't a character in my world.
>
> I think your line of reasoning is a good one, but by merely considering ontology
> you miss out on a crucial argument that strengthens your position against
> skepticism, and that is the notion of _morality_. Moral is about the principles
> of _value_, and in your argument you leave out the value aspects of your
> position. Put crudely your argument boils down to this:
>
> Since the hypothetical simulation has not impact on your life, you disregard it.

I think you are right that value cannot be disentangled from ontology.
But it is the ontology of the phenomenal world that value cannot
be separated from. I don't think there is such a thing as the ontology
of the thing as it is in itself, the noumenon, if this is something that resides
by definition outside of our cognitive reach altogether. Value is not
likewise outside of our cognitive reach.

But our having epistemic access to the phenomenal world is all that
is needed to undercut the skeptical argument, provided that the phenomenal
world if it is an objective, intersubjective, world that is not dependent on
being perceived (as in Berkeley.) It consists of all that is perceivable
in principle by myself or other possible subjects within it. The noumenon
is only introduced as a rhetorical device to point out the unintelligibility
of the disembodied subject of experiences that the skeptic postulates.
(Kant does not consign the noumenon to this role in his system but I need
only use it that way for my own argument to go through.)

> But WHY do you disregard it? What is the imperative to disregard something just
> because it does not matter to you? The key is that it DOES NOT MATTER TO YOU,
> i.e. the skeptical fantasy has no VALUE to you, other than as an amusing mind
> game for bored philosophers that have nothing better to do with their life.

I disregard it because I take it that there is a flaw in the argument.
The conundrum of the skeptic is that he must either say that he is,
qua subject of experience, the brain in the vat (or some functional
part/process of the computer simulating it) or rather that he is a phenomenal
character in the simulation. In either case he can not intelligibly state
the skeptical hypothesis he started with. Putnam proposed a similar argument
in the first chapter of his "Meaning, Truth and History." Anders Weinstein
also made a similar argument on comp.ai.philosophy a few years ago in a
discussion with Hans Moravec.

> My
> point is that your rejection of skepticism rests on a moral premise, namely that
> you value Life, your own existence as you know it. Thus, rejecting skepticism is
> a moral issue more than an ontological one. This becomes much clearer the very
> moment you try to follow through the logical conclusions of skepticism:
> "weeeell, if reality is just an illusion, then we don't have to care about what
> happens to us, we need not value ourselves, our destiny, our future, our being,
> because it is all just a figment of someone's imagination. We can do what we
> want to ourselves and to others, 'cause it's all an illusion." We reject
> skepticism by taking our life and our existence seriously and placing _value_ on
> it.

This was not my argument but there is something consonant with what
you say in Anthony Rudd, "Expressing the World, Skepticism, Wittgenstein
and Heidegger," Open Court, 2003. Rudd proposes a parallel between other
mind skepticism and external world skepticism. It the case of other mind
skepticism the ethical relevance is obvious. If other people really were
zombies with no subjective mental states then it would make no moral
difference how I would treat them. By comparison, external world
skepticism seems idle as a possibility. (Unless you view other mind
skepticism as a corollary of it, but this needs not be the case. The skeptic can
conceive that there be only minds inhabiting illusory bodies in an illusory
world.) The purpose of the parallel it to extend Wittgenstein's expressivist
conception of the behavioral manifestation of mental states to the case
of the external world. This is an interesting suggestion, and I think there
is something for it, but I am not finished assessing it so I won't comment
further.

(I have removed sci.physics from the followup list)

From:	Onar Åm
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 10 Jan 2005 00:07:08 +0100

"Pierre-Normand Houle" wrote in message
news:GjgDd.27005$PK6.280548@wagner.videotron.net...
>
>
> > But WHY do you disregard it? What is the imperative to disregard something
just
> > because it does not matter to you? The key is that it DOES NOT MATTER TO
YOU,
> > i.e. the skeptical fantasy has no VALUE to you, other than as an amusing
mind
> > game for bored philosophers that have nothing better to do with their life.
>
> I disregard it because I take it that there is a flaw in the argument.
> The conundrum of the skeptic is that he must either say that he is,
> qua subject of experience, the brain in the vat (or some functional
> part/process of the computer simulating it) or rather that he is a phenomenal
> character in the simulation. In either case he can not intelligibly state
> the skeptical hypothesis he started with. Putnam proposed a similar argument
> in the first chapter of his "Meaning, Truth and History." Anders Weinstein
> also made a similar argument on comp.ai.philosophy a few years ago in a
> discussion with Hans Moravec.

I've been thinking about this for a while. I still think that the general
argument of the skeptic is sound, namely that in principle there may exist many
alternate underlying realities that we cannot in principle know. The only thing
we can know for certain is the phenomenal world, including our own thoughts as
they present themselves to us. We can, however, not know with absolute certainty
that the world as we perceive it also happens to be the world as it really is.
We COULD be part of an elaborate simulation or even conspiracy to fool us into
believing that we live in a fullblown reality. What we believe to be knowledge
about this world COULD be massively wrong. For instance, we may have been
implanted with memories that make a card-board world appear real and coherent to
us, whereas in reality it is not. We may believe that the simulation is
self-coherent, holding a set of rules or laws of physics if you like, but we
have no idea of knowing whether the alleged simulation suddenly transmutes into
a whole set of different laws of physics, put in their for someone's amusement.
Thus, the principle position of the skeptic is indeed true: we cannot have
ABSOLUTE knowledge about reality. However, where the skeptics fail is in the
next conclusion, namely that this lack of absoluteness MATTERS. Bay giving a
marginal improbability equal voice as an overwhelming probability we are
essentially eradicating all possible value, and that is a MORAL position. By
saying that the world of infinite, unknowable possibilities is symmetric to the
perceivable world as we know it is to say that there is no more value in what we
perceive than in what we can dream up.

Onar.

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 16:10:35 GMT

On Mon, 27 Dec 2004 01:54:25 GMT, "robert j. kolker"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>
>
>Lester Zick wrote:
>
>> Epistemology 101
>> ----------
>>
>> (Positivism)
>>
>> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>> the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>> idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
>> one must judge value.
>
>Some facts are so manifest they can be decided by the Mark One Eyeball.
>Do you have a five dollar bill in your wallet? Take a look and see.
>What's in yer wallet?

See, now here's the difficulty. The facts you refer to as intuitively
obvious to the casual observer actually require the Mark One Mod 0
eyeball attached to a brain for a steady state solution. Otherwise all
you get is quantum mysticism in a jar.

Regards - Lester

From:	Uncle Al
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Sun, 26 Dec 2004 18:00:16 -0800

Lester Zick wrote:
>
> Epistemology 101
> ----------
>
> (Positivism)
>
> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
> the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
> idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
> one must judge value.
[snip]

Zick - are you still stooopid? Here's an easy one for you. Pick one:

1) Zick is correct.
2) The balance of reality is correct.

Choose wisely.

--
Uncle Al
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
(Toxic URL! Unsafe for children and most mammals)
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/qz.pdf

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 16:07:01 GMT

On Sun, 26 Dec 2004 18:00:16 -0800, Uncle Al
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>>
>> Epistemology 101
>> ----------
>>
>> (Positivism)
>>
>> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>> the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>> idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
>> one must judge value.
>[snip]
>
>Zick - are you still stooopid? Here's an easy one for you. Pick one:
>
> 1) Zick is correct.
> 2) The balance of reality is correct.
>
>Choose wisely.

Hi Uncle Ox. I choose both of the above as mutually inclusive.

Regards - Lester

From:	John Morrison
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Tue, 28 Dec 2004 03:03:05 -0000

Lester Zick wrote:
> On Sun, 26 Dec 2004 18:00:16 -0800, Uncle Al
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>> Lester Zick wrote:
>>>
>>> Epistemology 101
>>> ----------
>>>
>>> (Positivism)
>>>
>>> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>>> the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>>> idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge
>>> truth one must judge value.
>> [snip]
>>
>> Zick - are you still stooopid? Here's an easy one for you. Pick
>> one:
>>
>> 1) Zick is correct.
>> 2) The balance of reality is correct.
>>
>> Choose wisely.
>
> Hi Uncle Ox. I choose both of the above as mutually inclusive.
>
> Regards - Lester

And there was I, thinking that positivism was merely an outrageous trick
perpetrated by the bald on the wise - who would then tear out all their hair
in all-too-comprehending despair and disgust. From Auguste Comte to the
Wiener Kreis (and on!): ouch!

John
johnDOTmorrisonATtescoDOTnet
--
"Gegen [die] Dummheit kämpfen [die] Götter selbst vergebens." - Friedrich
von Schiller ("Die Jungfrau von Orléans", Act iii, Scene 6.)

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Tue, 28 Dec 2004 15:09:17 GMT

On Tue, 28 Dec 2004 03:03:05 -0000, "John Morrison"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Sun, 26 Dec 2004 18:00:16 -0800, Uncle Al
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>>> Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Epistemology 101
>>>> ----------
>>>>
>>>> (Positivism)
>>>>
>>>> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>>>> the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>>>> idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge
>>>> truth one must judge value.
>>> [snip]
>>>
>>> Zick - are you still stooopid? Here's an easy one for you. Pick
>>> one:
>>>
>>> 1) Zick is correct.
>>> 2) The balance of reality is correct.
>>>
>>> Choose wisely.
>>
>> Hi Uncle Ox. I choose both of the above as mutually inclusive.
>>
>> Regards - Lester
>
> And there was I, thinking that positivism was merely an outrageous trick
>perpetrated by the bald on the wise - who would then tear out all their hair
>in all-too-comprehending despair and disgust. From Auguste Comte to the
>Wiener Kreis (and on!): ouch!

Philosophers have always been interested in divorcing reality from
truth.The problem is they had no way to figure out what they had left.

Regards - Lester

From:	John Morrison
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Thu, 30 Dec 2004 01:36:15 -0000

Lester Zick wrote:
> On Tue, 28 Dec 2004 03:03:05 -0000, "John Morrison"
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>> Lester Zick wrote:
>>> On Sun, 26 Dec 2004 18:00:16 -0800, Uncle Al
>>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>
>>>> Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Epistemology 101
>>>>> ----------
>>>>>
>>>>> (Positivism)
>>>>>
>>>>> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations
>>>>> except the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall
>>>>> back on the idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one
>>>>> cannot judge truth one must judge value.
>>>> [snip]
>>>>
>>>> Zick - are you still stooopid? Here's an easy one for you. Pick
>>>> one:
>>>>
>>>> 1) Zick is correct.
>>>> 2) The balance of reality is correct.
>>>>
>>>> Choose wisely.
>>>
>>> Hi Uncle Ox. I choose both of the above as mutually inclusive.
>>>
>>> Regards - Lester
>>
>> And there was I, thinking that positivism was merely an
>> outrageous trick perpetrated by the bald on the wise - who would
>> then tear out all their hair in all-too-comprehending despair and
>> disgust. From Auguste Comte to the Wiener Kreis (and on!): ouch!
>
> Philosophers have always been interested in divorcing reality from
> truth.The problem is they had no way to figure out what they had left.
>
> Regards - Lester

Lester,

I think that you have missed my point altogether. Here is another way of
expressing disgust at the very _idea_:

"I thought that epistemology was the theory of pub-crawling, until I
read Bertrand Russell; and then I _knew_ it was." - [Philosophy Department,
University of Southampton: trad.]

I heard the latter in the late 1970s - and it still rings true, at least to
this pub-crawling Brit ...

Best wishes, Happy New Year, and, recalling that Wittgenstein once observed
to some of his students that he could conceive of a philosophical treatise
consisting of nothing but jokes: /please/ don't take this part-time
philosopher _too_ seriously!

John
johnDOTmorrisonATtescoDOTnet
--
"Reality rarely lives up to TV, usually because reality has a smaller budget
and the opportunities for retakes are minimal." - Brian Watson

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Thu, 30 Dec 2004 15:12:01 GMT

On Thu, 30 Dec 2004 01:36:15 -0000, "John Morrison"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>Lester Zick wrote:
>> On Tue, 28 Dec 2004 03:03:05 -0000, "John Morrison"
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>
>>> Lester Zick wrote:
>>>> On Sun, 26 Dec 2004 18:00:16 -0800, Uncle Al
>>>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Lester Zick wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Epistemology 101
>>>>>> ----------
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (Positivism)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations
>>>>>> except the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall
>>>>>> back on the idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one
>>>>>> cannot judge truth one must judge value.
>>>>> [snip]
>>>>>
>>>>> Zick - are you still stooopid? Here's an easy one for you. Pick
>>>>> one:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1) Zick is correct.
>>>>> 2) The balance of reality is correct.
>>>>>
>>>>> Choose wisely.
>>>>
>>>> Hi Uncle Ox. I choose both of the above as mutually inclusive.
>>>>
>>>> Regards - Lester
>>>
>>> And there was I, thinking that positivism was merely an
>>> outrageous trick perpetrated by the bald on the wise - who would
>>> then tear out all their hair in all-too-comprehending despair and
>>> disgust. From Auguste Comte to the Wiener Kreis (and on!): ouch!
>>
>> Philosophers have always been interested in divorcing reality from
>> truth.The problem is they had no way to figure out what they had left.
>>
>> Regards - Lester
>
>Lester,
>
> I think that you have missed my point altogether. Here is another way of
>expressing disgust at the very _idea_:
>
> "I thought that epistemology was the theory of pub-crawling, until I
>read Bertrand Russell; and then I _knew_ it was." - [Philosophy Department,
>University of Southampton: trad.]
>
>I heard the latter in the late 1970s - and it still rings true, at least to
>this pub-crawling Brit ...
>
>Best wishes, Happy New Year, and, recalling that Wittgenstein once observed
>to some of his students that he could conceive of a philosophical treatise
>consisting of nothing but jokes: /please/ don't take this part-time
>philosopher _too_ seriously!
>
>John
>johnDOTmorrisonATtescoDOTnet
>--
>"Reality rarely lives up to TV, usually because reality has a smaller budget
>and the opportunities for retakes are minimal." - Brian Watson

Hello John - A very happy new year to you and all. I don't tend to
take people very seriously. But I do take their words seriously, even
when they're jokes. Epistemology is just the theory of objective
knowledge, how it gets here and what we can do with it. If we're lucky
the result is science, including humor.I look on myself as a mechanic.
Debugging reality is what science and mechanics is all about.Debugging
other peoples' ideas of science is what epistemology is all about.

Regards - Lester

From:	Albert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Sun, 26 Dec 2004 21:18:15 -0600

Uncle Al wrote:

> Here's an easy one for you. Pick one:
>
> 1) Zick is correct.
> 2) The balance of reality is correct.
>
> Choose wisely.

False dichotomy. Trap fails.

--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"

From:	Neil W Rickert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 03:20:06 +0000 (UTC)

lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:

>Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
>one must judge value.

I agree that it falls back on utility. But I disagree with most of
what you wrote in that post. I won't quote it all.

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 16:04:46 GMT

On Mon, 27 Dec 2004 03:20:06 +0000 (UTC), Neil W Rickert
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
>
>>Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>>the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>>idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
>>one must judge value.
>
>I agree that it falls back on utility. But I disagree with most of
>what you wrote in that post. I won't quote it all.

Without partonizing your disagreement, Neil, which you haven't made
specific, what I meant is not that judgments do fall back on utility,
but that they should fall back on utility. I don't mind speculation.
But I consider truth a considerably preferable standard for science.

Regards - Lester

From:	Neil W Rickert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 16:44:22 +0000 (UTC)

lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:

>>>Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>>>the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>>>idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
>>>one must judge value.

>>I agree that it falls back on utility. But I disagree with most of
>>what you wrote in that post. I won't quote it all.

>Without partonizing your disagreement, Neil, which you haven't made
>specific, what I meant is not that judgments do fall back on utility,
>but that they should fall back on utility. I don't mind speculation.
>But I consider truth a considerably preferable standard for science.

But what is the basis for "truth"?

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 19:26:12 GMT

On Mon, 27 Dec 2004 16:44:22 +0000 (UTC), Neil W Rickert
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>>>lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
>
>>>>Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
>>>>the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
>>>>idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
>>>>one must judge value.
>
>>>I agree that it falls back on utility. But I disagree with most of
>>>what you wrote in that post. I won't quote it all.
>
>>Without partonizing your disagreement, Neil, which you haven't made
>>specific, what I meant is not that judgments do fall back on utility,
>>but that they should fall back on utility. I don't mind speculation.
>>But I consider truth a considerably preferable standard for science.
>
>But what is the basis for "truth"?

The only possible basis for truth is the mechanical reduction
T:[not][not not] because this tautology is not regressable. In other
words, every true and false relationship has to be compounded of this
mechanism because represents the only way empirical observations can
be linked to one another.

Scientists can readily explain how they falsify empirical observations
in terms of one another. They just can't explain how they connect one
empirical observation to another to form abstractions. This is why we
have ideas subsuming empirical observations without being able to
explain the source of those ideas in any mechanically reducible form.

I don't claim the extrapolation of this mechanical principle in
various scientific contexts is intuitively obvious to the casual
observer. But I do claim that it is the only form of self evident
truth possible in mechanical terms because it reduces to the one
standard of scientific truth conceivable in the presence or absence of
self contradiction. Conventional approaches to empirical science
use this standard in judging empirical observations relative to one
another. They just don't know how to apply the same standard of self
contradiction across the board to phenomena in general. If this seems
too philosophical for you, it's the reason I don't leave epistemology
to philosophers or empirical scientists. I want to get it right once
and for all so we don't have to keep going over the same old ground.

Regards - Lester

From:	Neil W Rickert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Mon, 27 Dec 2004 22:21:01 +0000 (UTC)

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lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>>But what is the basis for "truth"?

>The only possible basis for truth is the mechanical reduction
>T:[not][not not] because this tautology is not regressable.

But that leads to a completely solipsistic notion of truth. The
world is irrelevant. All you do is apply logic to a set of starting
assumptions. There is no way to contact reality.

> In other
>words, every true and false relationship has to be compounded of this
>mechanism because represents the only way empirical observations can
>be linked to one another.

You assert a connection with empirical observations, but you do not
say what that is.

>Scientists can readily explain how they falsify empirical observations
>in terms of one another.

Which is to say that scientists do have some basis for truth other
than what you asserted.

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From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Tue, 28 Dec 2004 16:26:10 GMT

On Mon, 27 Dec 2004 22:21:01 +0000 (UTC), Neil W Rickert
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA1
>
>lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>>>But what is the basis for "truth"?
>
>>The only possible basis for truth is the mechanical reduction
>>T:[not][not not] because this tautology is not regressable.
>
>But that leads to a completely solipsistic notion of truth. The
>world is irrelevant. All you do is apply logic to a set of starting
>assumptions. There is no way to contact reality.

It leads to a completely solipsistic notion of truth in which the
world and reality are relevant only because the mechanics involved
in the solipsism tell us so.

I think we've discussed this before in passing. Where do you think
everything lies? It, they, and everything lies in the mind/brain
complex. If the mechanics are subjective, ie. conclusions drawn
through differences between differences, the only place it can lie is
within the mind/brain complex.

But that doesn't mean it doesn't tell us what is really out there.
People can ignore the implications of what they know about what is out
there. That's one implication of subjective mechanics. But the logical
implications of what is in here remain in here regardless and explain
what is out there and why even if we choose to ignore it.

The problem is that science has no general idea how what is out there
actually gets or can get in here. We don't copy what is out there. We
infer what is out there from what is in here. And the way we do that
is through exhaustive logic in the form of

t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject]

applied in various combinations through general application of

T:[not][not not]

because T is not mechanically regressable.

There are no starting assumptions involved whatsoever. There are only
starting mechanics and that mechanics is defined by the unregressable
nature of T.

>> In other
>>words, every true and false relationship has to be compounded of this
>>mechanism because represents the only way empirical observations can
>>be linked to one another.
>
>You assert a connection with empirical observations, but you do not
>say what that is.

t:[subject][not subject] is an empirical observation together with its
negation. And the connection between empirical observations is drawn
through series of such minor truths variously interconnected.

>>Scientists can readily explain how they falsify empirical observations
>>in terms of one another.
>
>Which is to say that scientists do have some basis for truth other
>than what you asserted.

Not at all. What scientists have is a basis for falsification. That
basis is self contradiction. They have no mechanical basis for truth,
explaining things in terms of one another such that they understand
why things are variously related. This shows up in places like quantum
effects where scientists don't have a clue as to causal interrelations
among various quantum effects.

In effect, scientists can readily explain what they don't know; they
just can't readily explain what they know. They explain what they
don't know through self contradiction. They just don't understand the
mechanism for what they do know in relation to other things.

Regards - Lester

From:	Neil W Rickert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Tue, 28 Dec 2004 21:11:03 +0000 (UTC)

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lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>I think we've discussed this before in passing. Where do you think
>everything lies? It, they, and everything lies in the mind/brain
>complex. If the mechanics are subjective, ie. conclusions drawn
>through differences between differences, the only place it can lie is
>within the mind/brain complex.

The trouble with most AI/CogScience discussions is that there is an
overemphasis on internal processing. In my view, the place to look
is in our interactions with the world. There will, of course, be
internal processing in order to control that interaction. But it is
the interaction that is most important. Thus I don't agree with your
emphasis on the mind/brain complex.

>But that doesn't mean it doesn't tell us what is really out there.
>People can ignore the implications of what they know about what is out
>there. That's one implication of subjective mechanics. But the logical
>implications of what is in here remain in here regardless and explain
>what is out there and why even if we choose to ignore it.

>The problem is that science has no general idea how what is out there
>actually gets or can get in here.

Are you saying that scientists don't know what they are doing? That
seems wrong. I grant that philosophers don't know what scientists
are doing.

>actually gets or can get in here. We don't copy what is out there. We
>infer what is out there from what is in here. And the way we do that
>is through exhaustive logic in the form of

But if we infer what is out there, from what do we make the
inference?

>>Which is to say that scientists do have some basis for truth other
>>than what you asserted.

>Not at all. What scientists have is a basis for falsification.

This is nonsense, presumably coming from philosophers who ought to
know better.

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From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Tue, 28 Dec 2004 23:06:17 GMT

On Tue, 28 Dec 2004 21:11:03 +0000 (UTC), Neil W Rickert
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA1
>
>lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
>> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>>I think we've discussed this before in passing. Where do you think
>>everything lies? It, they, and everything lies in the mind/brain
>>complex. If the mechanics are subjective, ie. conclusions drawn
>>through differences between differences, the only place it can lie is
>>within the mind/brain complex.
>
>The trouble with most AI/CogScience discussions is that there is an
>overemphasis on internal processing. In my view, the place to look
>is in our interactions with the world.

And where do you think I'm looking? The interface between interactions
with the world and the mind is the brain and that is where differences
between differences occur. There is no internal and no external except
as defined by the mechanics of differences between differences. Given
some specific t:[subject][not subject][subject not subject] the phrase
[subject] is an empirical observation and the phrase [not subject] is
a logical inference based on that empirical observation which has to
define an internality only because the result of negation has to be
limited, in other words defined, in scope.

> There will, of course, be
>internal processing in order to control that interaction. But it is
>the interaction that is most important. Thus I don't agree with your
>emphasis on the mind/brain complex.

Where do you think the interaction occurs and is defined if not at the
mind/brain interface between the out there and the in here?Definitions
of interactions only result from negation of empirical observation.

>>But that doesn't mean it doesn't tell us what is really out there.
>>People can ignore the implications of what they know about what is out
>>there. That's one implication of subjective mechanics. But the logical
>>implications of what is in here remain in here regardless and explain
>>what is out there and why even if we choose to ignore it.
>
>>The problem is that science has no general idea how what is out there
>>actually gets or can get in here.
>
>Are you saying that scientists don't know what they are doing? That
>seems wrong. I grant that philosophers don't know what scientists
>are doing.

Apart from the criterion of falsification through self contradiction,
that's exactly what I'm saying. I will also grant that philosophers
don't know what scientists are doing. But I will not grant that I do
not know what scientists are doing. Nor will I grant that I am a
philosopher as you seem to think. I crossed that threshold in spades
when I developed an ultimate truth regression T:[not][not not].

>>actually gets or can get in here. We don't copy what is out there. We
>>infer what is out there from what is in here. And the way we do that
>>is through exhaustive logic in the form of
>
>But if we infer what is out there, from what do we make the
>inference?

From whatever is out there through t:[subject][not subject][subject
not subject] which encompasses truth exhaustively, taken in
conjunction with t's referencing other subjects. The phrase [subject]
is any empirical observation and not merely whatever someone observes
in experimental contexts as empiricists prefer. It includes all kinds
of things including but not limited to ideas, sights, sounds, as well
as abstractions of all kinds, etc.

I really don't see what the problem is here. Are you denying we infer
all things, even at the most elementary sensory level? If not, what do
you imagine occurs, these things slip into our brains like so many
grains of sand into shoes? That would make you some kind of extrinsic
identity mystic. If we don't get ideas directly from out there, then
we pretty much have to get them from in here. Where do you imagine
self contradiction for ordinary scientific falsification occurs? Out
there effects are whatever they are. The self contradiction occurs in
here not out there.

>>>Which is to say that scientists do have some basis for truth other
>>>than what you asserted.
>
>>Not at all. What scientists have is a basis for falsification.
>
>This is nonsense, presumably coming from philosophers who ought to
>know better.

I know exactly better. Which is what makes me a scientist because I
can and do prove what I say through self contradiction instead of
empiricist philosophical scientists trying to apply ideas on quantum
effects with no idea what ideas are or what mechanics is or entails.

Regards - Lester

From:	Neil W Rickert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 15:57:04 +0000 (UTC)

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lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>>The trouble with most AI/CogScience discussions is that there is an
>>overemphasis on internal processing. In my view, the place to look
>>is in our interactions with the world.

>And where do you think I'm looking?

I don't know. You talk about "differences between differences" which
doesn't make a lot of sense. Your comments about truth seem to be
about internal matters.

Perhaps I don't know how to read what you write.

>Where do you think the interaction occurs and is defined if not at the
>mind/brain interface between the out there and the in here?Definitions
>of interactions only result from negation of empirical observation.

There is no mind/brain interface, as best I can tell. The first is
virtual, and the second real.

>From whatever is out there through t:[subject][not subject][subject
>not subject] which encompasses truth exhaustively, taken in
>conjunction with t's referencing other subjects. The phrase [subject]
>is any empirical observation and not merely whatever someone observes
>in experimental contexts as empiricists prefer. It includes all kinds
>of things including but not limited to ideas, sights, sounds, as well
>as abstractions of all kinds, etc.

It seems that everything is concealed behind cryptic terminology.
That apparently allows you to say that you have explained everything,
yet from what I can see you have explained nothing.

>I really don't see what the problem is here. Are you denying we infer
>all things, even at the most elementary sensory level?

The ordinary meaning of "infer" would seem to exclude what happens at
the most elementary sensory level.

>>>>Which is to say that scientists do have some basis for truth other
>>>>than what you asserted.

>>>Not at all. What scientists have is a basis for falsification.

>>This is nonsense, presumably coming from philosophers who ought to
>>know better.

>I know exactly better. Which is what makes me a scientist because I
>can and do prove what I say through self contradiction instead of
>empiricist philosophical scientists trying to apply ideas on quantum
>effects with no idea what ideas are or what mechanics is or entails.

Falsification can only disprove. It cannot prove.

If falsification is all that is available, then the amount of known
science should be steadily diminishing as more and more is
falsified.

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From:	robert j. kolker
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 16:37:34 GMT

Neil W Rickert wrote:

>
> If falsification is all that is available, then the amount of known
> science should be steadily diminishing as more and more is
> falsified.

If hypotheses are proposed at a faster rate than falsifications
established then the amount of science will increase.

Suppose three corroberated hypotheses are produced for every falsified
hypotheses. (Just as an example). The number of corroberated
non-falsified hypotheses will increase. More science.

Bob Kolker

From:	patty
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 16:47:01 GMT

robert j. kolker wrote:

>
>
> Neil W Rickert wrote:
>
>>
>> If falsification is all that is available, then the amount of known
>> science should be steadily diminishing as more and more is
>> falsified.
>
>
> If hypotheses are proposed at a faster rate than falsifications
> established then the amount of science will increase.
>
> Suppose three corroberated hypotheses are produced for every falsified
> hypotheses. (Just as an example). The number of corroberated
> non-falsified hypotheses will increase. More science.
>
> Bob Kolker
>

Shirley, you gest !

patty

From:	robert j. kolker
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 17:10:39 GMT

patty wrote:
> Shirley, you gest !

Stop calling me surely.

Bob Kolker

From:	Neil W Rickert
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 17:12:29 +0000 (UTC)

"robert j. kolker" writes:
>Neil W Rickert wrote:

>> If falsification is all that is available, then the amount of known
>> science should be steadily diminishing as more and more is
>> falsified.

>If hypotheses are proposed at a faster rate than falsifications
>established then the amount of science will increase.

>Suppose three corroberated hypotheses are produced for every falsified
>hypotheses. (Just as an example). The number of corroberated
>non-falsified hypotheses will increase. More science.

By talking of "corroberated hypotheses" you have already implied that
there is more going on than falsification.

From:	robert j. kolker
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 17:33:48 GMT

Neil W Rickert wrote:
> By talking of "corroberated hypotheses" you have already implied that
> there is more going on than falsification.

Indeed there is. Falsification is one possible outcome of an experiment.

Bob Kolker

>

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 19:08:49 GMT

On Wed, 29 Dec 2004 17:33:48 GMT, "robert j. kolker"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>
>
>Neil W Rickert wrote:
>> By talking of "corroberated hypotheses" you have already implied that
>> there is more going on than falsification.
>
>Indeed there is. Falsification is one possible outcome of an experiment.

What's another? Non falsification? The outcome of an experiment is
just another empirical observation to be explained. Experiments don't
confirm ideas because they don't explain them.

Regards - Lester

From:	Skup
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 18:53:21 -0500

Lester Zick wrote:
> On Wed, 29 Dec 2004 17:33:48 GMT, "robert j. kolker"
> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
>
>
>>
>>Neil W Rickert wrote:
>>
>>>By talking of "corroberated hypotheses" you have already implied that
>>>there is more going on than falsification.
>>
>>Indeed there is. Falsification is one possible outcome of an experiment.
>
>
> What's another? Non falsification? The outcome of an experiment is
> just another empirical observation to be explained. Experiments don't
> confirm ideas because they don't explain them.
>
> Regards - Lester

I agree. I always thought a result was one of three things (True,
false, or inconclusive).

--
--Skup

Good judgement comes from bad experience. Alot of that comes from bad
judgement...

From:	robert j. kolker
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 19:46:57 GMT

Lester Zick wrote:

>
> What's another? Non falsification? The outcome of an experiment is
> just another empirical observation to be explained. Experiments don't
> confirm ideas because they don't explain them.

Corroberation motivates one to test a theory still further. Also the
experiment may produce facts necessary for applications.

Bob Kolker

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 22:46:54 GMT

On Wed, 29 Dec 2004 19:46:57 GMT, "robert j. kolker"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>
>
>Lester Zick wrote:
>
>>
>> What's another? Non falsification? The outcome of an experiment is
>> just another empirical observation to be explained. Experiments don't
>> confirm ideas because they don't explain them.
>
>Corroberation motivates one to test a theory still further. Also the
>experiment may produce facts necessary for applications.

Sure. Most non self contradictions do if the observer thinks with
more than his eyeball because he recognizes there is more than one
observation with potentially the same explanation. But this doesn't
corroborate his theory for the first observation. It just fails to
contradict it.

Regards - Lester

From:	robert j. kolker
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 23:12:13 GMT

Lester Zick wrote:
>
> Sure. Most non self contradictions do if the observer thinks with
> more than his eyeball because he recognizes there is more than one
> observation with potentially the same explanation. But this doesn't
> corroborate his theory for the first observation. It just fails to
> contradict it.

That is as good as it gets. No finite set of experiments will prove a
theory is true, but one adverse experiment, not otherwise explainable
can falsify a theory.

Bob Kolker

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Thu, 30 Dec 2004 15:00:19 GMT

On Wed, 29 Dec 2004 23:12:13 GMT, "robert j. kolker"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>
>
>Lester Zick wrote:
>>
>> Sure. Most non self contradictions do if the observer thinks with
>> more than his eyeball because he recognizes there is more than one
>> observation with potentially the same explanation. But this doesn't
>> corroborate his theory for the first observation. It just fails to
>> contradict it.
>
>That is as good as it gets. No finite set of experiments will prove a
>theory is true, but one adverse experiment, not otherwise explainable
>can falsify a theory.

OK. This I buy. Except that I think it can get a little better if we
can prove that alternatives to a theory are self contradictory, in
which case the theory is proven true by default.

Regards - Lester

From:	robert j. kolker
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Thu, 30 Dec 2004 15:51:41 GMT

Lester Zick wrote:
>
> OK. This I buy. Except that I think it can get a little better if we
> can prove that alternatives to a theory are self contradictory, in
> which case the theory is proven true by default.

No can do. There are an infinite number of alternatives. How long will
it take for you to show each of them leads to a contradiction or
empirical refutation.

We cannot determine whether our theories are True. Get used to it.

Bob Kolker

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Thu, 30 Dec 2004 19:17:37 GMT

On Thu, 30 Dec 2004 15:51:41 GMT, "robert j. kolker"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>
>
>Lester Zick wrote:
>>
>> OK. This I buy. Except that I think it can get a little better if we
>> can prove that alternatives to a theory are self contradictory, in
>> which case the theory is proven true by default.
>
>No can do. There are an infinite number of alternatives. How long will
>it take for you to show each of them leads to a contradiction or
>empirical refutation.
>
>We cannot determine whether our theories are True. Get used to it.

This reminisces me of the old saying "the difficult we do right away;
the impossible takes a little longer". Can do:

A) Theory: [not]

B) Tautologically exhaustive alternatives: [not not]

C) Self contradictory alternatives [not not]

D) A is proven true because conceivable alternatives are self
contradictory and therefore false.

E) Everything is [not] or [differences] because alternatives such as
[not not] or [different from differences] are self contradictory.

QED

Regards - Lester

From:	Lester Zick
Subject:	Re: Epistemology 101
Date:	Wed, 29 Dec 2004 19:24:25 GMT

On Wed, 29 Dec 2004 16:37:34 GMT, "robert j. kolker"
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:

>
>
>Neil W Rickert wrote:
>
>>
>> If falsification is all that is available, then the amount of known
>> science should be steadily diminishing as more and more is
>> falsified.
>
>If hypotheses are proposed at a faster rate than falsifications
>established then the amount of science will increase.
>
>Suppose three corroberated hypotheses are produced for every falsified
>hypotheses. (Just as an example). The number of corroberated
>non-falsified hypotheses will increase. More science.

This is correct as far as it goes. Scientific reduction leads to
subsuming additional subjects for scientific analysis.

There are different ways to look at scientific reduction. We could
reduce the number of explanations by increasing the complexity of each
explanation. Materialists do this when they collate every event in the
history of the earth and claim that as an explanation for everything
we might wish to know about. The number of explanations has been
reduced to one by increasing the complexity of that explanation to
everything.

The alternative approach to scientific reduction is to simplify and
reduce the complexity of explanations for various things we want to
know about. This is what science does in analytical terms, ultimately
hoping to reduce the explanation for everything to a single or minimal
number of elements.

Then the application of a scientific reduction can be applied to other
subjects we could not previously approach in scientific terms. But
there is a precedence involved. Newton preceeded Einstein for the same
reason Mendel preceeded Crick and Watson. But none of this would have
been possible if Newton or Mendel had fully embraced the materialist
view of explanations and merely reduced the number of explanations by
increasing the complexity of each explanation.

Regards - Lester